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RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS 
Maurice E. Stucke* 
Abstract: Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust 
is thriving internationally. On the other hand, antitrust’s influence has 
diminished domestically. Over the past thirty years, there have been fewer 
antitrust investigations and private actions. Today the U.S. Supreme Court 
complains about antitrust suits and places greater faith in the antitrust 
function being subsumed in a regulatory framework. Two important fac-
tors contributed to this decline. The first is the salience of the U.S. anti-
trust goals. In the past thirty years, enforcers and courts abandoned anti-
trust’s political, social, and moral goals in their quest for a single economic 
goal. Second, antitrust policy increasingly relied on an incomplete, dis-
torted conception of competition by adopting the Chicago School’s sim-
plifying assumptions of self-correcting markets composed of rational, self-
interested market participants. In this current economic climate, the 
United States is ripe for a new antitrust policy cycle. The quest for a single 
economic goal failed. Further, four oft-cited economic goals (ensuring an 
effective competitive process, promoting consumer welfare, maximizing 
efficiency, and ensuring economic freedom) never unified antitrust analy-
sis. This Article proposes how to integrate antitrust’s multiple policy objec-
tives into the legal framework. It outlines a blended goal approach and de-
scribes how this approach would provide better legal standards and would 
revive antitrust’s relevance. 
Introduction 
 Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is 
thriving. The past twenty years witnessed more countries with antitrust 
laws and the birth and growth of the international organization of gov-
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ernmental competition authorities, the International Competition Net-
work (ICN), with over 100 member countries.1 China viewed, until the 
late 1970s, the term competition pejoratively as a “capitalist monster.”2 
Now China, Russia, and India have competition laws. Domestically, the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), decimated 
during the Reagan administration,3 has more prosecutors today than in 
the 1960s.4 Its 2010 budget, adjusted for inflation, is more than triple its 
1965 level.5 The American Bar Association’s (ABA) Antitrust Section 
boasts over 8000 “attorneys and non-lawyers from private law firms, in-
house counsel, non-profit organizations, consulting firms, federal and 
state government agencies, as well as judges, professors and law stu-
dents.”6 No other country affords private antitrust plaintiffs the combi-
nation of (1) broad, civil discovery largely determined by the parties, 
rather than the courts;7 (2) the ability to lower individual litigation costs 
by bringing antitrust claims, at times, as a class;8 (3) automatic treble 
damages;9 (4) recovery of the costs of a successful suit, including rea-
                                                                                                                      
1 Int’l Competition Network, The ICN’s Vision for Its Second Decade, Pre-
sented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN 1 (2011), available at www.interna- 
tionalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc755.pdf. 
2 Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in Progress, 54 
Antitrust Bull. 579, 580 (2009). 
3 GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives: Changes in Antitrust Enforcement Policies and Activities 4 (1990), 
available at http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/142779.pdf (“Between fiscal years 1980 and 
1989, the Division staff declined from 883 (including 429 attorneys) to 458 (including 209 
attorneys).”). 
4 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in The Paranoid Style 
in American Politics and Other Essays 188, 194 (Vintage 2008) (noting the 300 Anti-
trust Division lawyers in 1962); DOJ, Antitrust Div., FY 2012 Congressional Budget 
Submission 48 (2011), available at www.justice.gov/jmd/2012justification/pdf/fy12-atr-
justification.pdf (reporting that the Antitrust Division’s 2012 budget had 880 authorized 
employee positions, of which 390 were for attorneys). The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which enforces both consumer protection and competition law, had 600 lawyers at 
the end of its 2010 fiscal year. FTC, Performance and Accountability Report—Fiscal 
Year 2010, at 6 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2010parreport.pdf. 
5 Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division, Fiscal Years 1903–2012, DOJ (Dec. 2011), 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/atr-appropriation-figures.html. The Antitrust Division’s 2010 
budget was $163,170,000. Id. Its 1965 budget was $7,072,000, id., which adjusted for inflation, 
equals approximately $48.9 million in 2010 dollars. Inflation Calculator: The Changing Value of a 
Dollar, DollarTimes, http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm (enter dollar 
amount in box on level, adjust years, and calculate) (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
6 Section of Antitrust Law: Who We Are, Am. Bar Ass’n, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/ 
home.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. 
8 Id. 23. 
9 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
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sonable attorney’s fees;10 (5) broad injunctive relief;11 (6) a per se illegal 
standard for evaluating price-fixing and other “hard-core” cartel behav-
ior;12 (7) expansive jurisdictional rules; and (8) the use of collateral es-
toppel for follow-on private antitrust suits.13 
 Yet, on the other hand, antitrust’s influence in the United States 
has diminished. One used to hear of antitrust’s importance. The U.S. 
Supreme Court once called the federal antitrust laws, “the Magna Carta 
of free enterprise” in preserving economic freedom and the free-
enterprise system.14 Today the Court complains about antitrust suits,15 
and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a 
regulatory framework.16 Presidential candidates once debated antitrust 
policy. Now candidates rarely mention, much less debate, antitrust pol-
icy.17 Americans once had “a deep feeling of unrest” and fear of “an-
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. 
11 Id. § 26. 
12 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (stating that, if the United States brings a civil or criminal antitrust 
action and testimony is taken, then any resulting final judgment or consent decree can be 
used as prima facie evidence against defendants for the same conduct in later private anti-
trust actions). 
14 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
15 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007) (com-
plaining that antitrust’s per se illegal standard might increase litigation costs by promoting 
“frivolous” suits); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007) 
(fearing “unusually” high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007) (indicating that antitrust’s “inevitably costly and 
protracted discovery phase” is hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision (quoting 
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003))); Veri-
zon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (de-
crying antitrust’s “interminable litigation”). 
16 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 459 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“When a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive 
harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits.”); Credit 
Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283; Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414–15; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private 
Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 629, 636 (2010). 
17 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1375, 1390–98, 1450–52 (2009) [hereinafter Stucke, Rule of Reason] (discussing the 
Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt debate over the rule-of-reason standard and the Reagan administra-
tion’s departure from earlier Republican administrations in antitrust enforcement). Anti-
trust, however, is occasionally mentioned by candidates. For example, President George W. 
Bush, in the 2000 campaign, expressed concern that breaking up Microsoft as part of the 
ongoing antitrust litigation would hurt innovation. He also promised to scale back anti-
trust enforcement to cases of overt price-fixing. David Warsh, High Noon, Bos. Globe, Apr. 
9, 2000, at K1. He delivered on both counts. The DOJ, under his administration, did not 
seek to break up Microsoft, and primarily brought price-fixing cases. See Maurice E. Stucke, 
Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 497, 500 n.21 [hereinafter 
Stucke, Government Prosecute Monopolies?]. 
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other kind of slavery” from the aggregations of capital in the hands of a 
few individuals and corporations.18 By the mid-1960s, antitrust became 
“complex, difficult, and boring.”19 By 2004, many young Americans 
were unconcerned about economic concentration.20 Among the factors 
used by Gallup’s chief economist to explain this disparity was that the 
federal government no longer pursued monopolies the way it once did 
(therefore, younger people did not have such a negative view of mo-
nopolies), and that the antitrust laws were no longer emphasized in 
business schools the way they once were.21 Few people apparently fol-
lowed the DOJ’s monopolization case against Microsoft.22 When the 
consent decree expired in 2011, several questioned what the remedy 
accomplished.23 
                                                                                                                     
 So, as historian Richard Hofstadter asked in the mid-1960s, what 
happened to the antitrust movement in the United States? “[O]nce the 
United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecu-
tions,” observed Hofstadter.24 By the 1960s, however, there were “anti-
trust prosecutions without an antitrust movement.”25 Today we have far 
fewer antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement. Since the 
 
18 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
19 Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189. 
20 Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with “Big Business,” Gallup 
(Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youthful-Optimism-Young-Americans-
Happy-Big-Business.aspx. Fifty-four percent of Americans ages eighteen to twenty-nine were 
very or somewhat satisfied with the size and influence of major corporations, which was fif-
teen percentage points higher than the next-most optimistic age group (thirty to forty-nine 
year olds). Satisfaction with major corporations decreased even more among the older age 
groups. Id. As a consequence of the economic crisis, many Americans, including the Occupy 
movement, have criticized the concentration of wealth and power in the United States, with 
its effects on our democracy. See Maurice E. Stucke, Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust, S. Cal. L. 
Rev. Postscript (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002234; see also 
infra notes 368–373 and accompanying text. 
21 Lyons, supra note 20. 
22 Pew Research Cent. for the People & the Press, Bradley and McCain Bios 
Count More: Campaign Incidents Have Little Punch 9 (1999), available at http://www. 
people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/49.pdf (reporting that only eleven percent of people sur-
veyed said they followed reports of the antitrust trial against Microsoft). 
23 Norman Hawker & Robert Lande, As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft Is Victorious in Defeat, 
Balt. Sun, May 16, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-05-16/news/bs-ed-
microsoft-20110516_1_windows-monopoly-web-browser-market-internet-explorer; Jay Greene, 
Microsoft Oversight Ends with Little to Show for Effort, Cnet, May 12, 2011, http://news.cnet. 
com/8301-10805_3-20062079-75.html. 
24 Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189. 
25 Id. 
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1970s, the number of private antitrust lawsuits26 and DOJ investigations 
under sections 127 and 228 of the Sherman Act has declined. 
 Within the U.S. legal academy, antitrust’s significance has dimin-
ished. The number of law journal articles that mention antitrust, the 
Sherman Act, or the Clayton Act steadily increased after the 1930s, 
peaked between 1980 and 1984 (when the Reagan administration em-
braced the Chicago School paradigm), and steadily declined thereaf-
ter.29 The same trend appears in the frequency of books published since 
the 1930s that mention antitrust,30 the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), or the DOJ’s Antitrust Division.31 After a string of Supreme 
Court defeats for antitrust plaintiffs, the cover of the American Bar As-
sociation’s fall 2007 Antitrust magazine asked, “The End of Antitrust as 
We Know It?” and one antitrust lawyer wrote, 
The rhetoric and, arguably, the enforcement records of the 
agencies—outside the cartel area—are less activist now than at 
any time in recent years. No one would seriously suggest that 
we are witnessing the end of antitrust. But is it the end of anti-
trust as we once knew it, at least in the United States? If so, 
how should we feel about it?32 
 What explains this anomaly? Why is antitrust growing internation-
ally, yet declining domestically? There are two important factors. The 
first is salience, especially the salience of U.S. antitrust goals. U.S. anti-
trust policy has been marked by four twenty- to thirty-year-long cycles: 
(1) 1900–1920, after initial dormancy, the promise of antitrust; (2) 
                                                                                                                      
26 See infra App., Fig. 1. 
27 See infra App., Fig. 2. The number neither includes FTC investigations nor captures 
the DOJ investigation’s success or impact. Kenneth M. Davidson, Am. Antitrust Inst., 
Commentary: Numerology and the Mismeasurement of Competition Laws 28 
(2008), available at www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/11012 (click “Commentary” to access 
report) (critiquing reliance on antitrust enforcement statistics). 
28 Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2001–2010, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/workload-statistics.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
29 See infra App., Fig. 3. Most of these journals existed since the 1930s. Two caveats: (1) 
antitrust articles could appear more frequently in specialty and other law journals and (2) 
the number of articles does not necessarily equate with the articles’ significance. 
30 A search of books on Google Books’ Ngram Viewer (http://ngrams.googlelabs. 
com/info), which “displays a graph showing how those phrases have occurred in a corpus 
of books” between 1930 and 2008 for all English books, shows a similar trend for the term 
antitrust, with an earlier peak for the number of books mentioning the Sherman Act and 
Clayton Act. See infra App., Figs. 4, 5, 6. In contrast, the term law has seen a more modest 
decline over the same period. See infra App., Fig. 7. 
31 See infra App., Figs. 8, 9. 
32 Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note: The End of Antitrust?, Antitrust, Fall 2007, at 5. 
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1920s–mid-1930s, antitrust dormancy in the boom and bust years; (3) 
mid-1940s–1970s, antitrust representing “the Magna Carta of free en-
terprise” in preserving economic and political freedom; and (4) late-
1970s–2010, antitrust’s contraction under the Chicago and post-
Chicago Schools’ neoclassical economic theories.33 In the last cycle, 
some enforcers viewed antitrust’s more salient political, social, and 
moral goals as somehow diluting antitrust policy.34 Antitrust’s increased 
technicality and the use of unappealing, abstract economic concepts 
broadened the gap between antitrust enforcement and public concern. 
Along with antitrust’s noneconomic goals went its historic concern 
about arresting economic power in its incipiency. 
 A second factor is that antitrust policy during the past policy cycle 
relied on an incomplete, distorted conception of competition. Adopt-
ing the Chicago School’s simplifying assumptions of self-correcting 
markets, composed of rational, self-interested market participants, 
some courts and enforcers sacrificed important political, social, and 
moral values to promote certain economic beliefs.35 They accepted the 
increased risks from concentrated telecommunications,36 financial,37 
and radio38 industries, among others, for the prospect of future effi-
ciencies and innovation.39 They ignored, however, an important anti-
trust concern, namely the Bailout Dilemma.40 
 Given the anger over taxpayer bailouts for firms deemed too-big-
and-integral-to-fail, wealth inequality that accelerated during the last 
policy cycle,41 and current budget cuts and austerity measures, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
33 Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust 2025, CPI Antitrust J., Dec. 2010, at 1, 2, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727251. 
34 See id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 8. 
36 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 244–
45 (2010). 
37 Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Thirteen Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover 
and the Next Financial Meltdown 12, 203 (2010); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for 
Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-to-
Fail” Phenomenon, 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 261, 291 (2011). 
38 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is a 
Bad Idea, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 115, 128–30 (2010). 
39 See Bigness Is Not Bad: White House and Greenspan Defend Mergers, San Jose Mercury 
News, June 17, 1998, at 1C. 
40 See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic 
Theory, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257, 268–69 (1995) (stating that “economic power’s capacity to 
obtain government bailouts—regardless of how incompetent, inefficient, and unprogres-
sive those who wield it may be—as the ultimate perversion of private enterprise”). 
41 G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, Who Rules America?, http:// 
sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last updated Nov. 2011). 
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United States is ripe for a new antitrust policy cycle. If so, what issues 
will drive it? 
 Two issues drove past cycles and will likely drive the next one: what 
is competition and what are the goals of competition law?42 Only after 
policymakers reconsider what is competition43 and what are the goals 
of competition law, can they answer the third question—what should be 
the legal standards and rules to promote these goals? Accordingly, this 
Article calls for policymakers to reconsider antitrust’s goals. 
 Part I summarizes the shift during the last policy cycle from em-
bracing multiple political, social, moral, and economic goals to the cur-
rent debate over a single economic goal.44 Part II discusses why four oft-
cited economic goals (ensuring an effective competitive process, pro-
moting consumer welfare, maximizing efficiency, and ensuring eco-
nomic freedom) failed to unify antitrust analysis.45 Part III discusses why 
it is unrealistic to believe that a single, well-defined antitrust objective 
exists.46 Part IV proposes how to account for antitrust’s multiple policy 
objectives in the legal framework. It outlines a blended goal approach, 
the risks of this approach, and its benefits in providing better legal stan-
dards and reviving antitrust’s salience.47 
I. Antitrust’s Goals 
 Part I of this Article addresses antitrust’s goals and explains how the 
debate over the goal(s) has impacted antitrust policy.48 Section A exam-
ines the importance of antitrust’s objectives and in defining those objec-
                                                                                                                      
As of 2007, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 34.6% of all 
privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, and 
small business stratum) had 50.5%, which means that just 20% of the people 
owned a remarkable 85%, leaving only 15% of the wealth for the bottom 80% 
(wage and salary workers). 
Id. 
42 Broader situational factors (e.g., political factors, such as appointment of judges and 
agency executives under Reagan; developments in economic theories and tools; and insti-
tutional factors, such as the role of economists at the agencies) affected antitrust policy 
shifts and manifested themselves in these two questions. 
43 See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, 81 Miss. L.J. 108 (2012) 
(showing how no satisfactory comprehensive definition of competition exists and how 
varying one premise of competition—the relative rationality of market firms and consum-
ers—yields different conceptions of competition). 
44 See infra notes 48–108 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 109–287 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 288–382 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 383–450 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 53–108 and accompanying text. 
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tives.49 Section B traces the history of antitrust’s goals, focusing particu-
larly on its political, moral, and social goals.50 Section C then analyzes 
the Chicago School scholars’ quest for identifying a single economic 
goal and the influence these scholars have had on antitrust policy.51 Fi-
nally, Section D identifies multiple antitrust goals present across the in-
ternational community.52 
A. Importance of Defining Antitrust’s Objectives 
 The battle over antitrust begins with its goals. As the Chicago 
School recognized, defining the goals of antitrust is paramount: “Every-
thing else follows from the answer we give.”53 Defining antitrust’s objec-
tives serves several important purposes. 
 First, the antitrust objectives inform the law’s enforcement and 
application.54 The objectives can shape enforcement policy and priori-
ties. They can alert policymakers to any gaps between actual and de-
sired outcomes from current enforcement. They can assist the courts in 
applying antitrust legal standards to assure that the result is aligned 
with the objectives. 
 Second, to the extent measurable and transparent, the objectives 
can increase the accountability of government antitrust enforcers, “in-
crease transparency and facilitate reasoned debate to the extent that 
they make explicit the rationales for decisions in individual cases.”55 
Finally, in any jurisdiction with multiple enforcers (such as federal and 
state antitrust agencies and private plaintiffs in the United States), de-
fining objectives ensures that antitrust enforcers (and other law en-
forcement officials) are not thwarting each other’s efforts. One agency 
can increase enforcement when another is lax, yet still direct all en-
forcement toward consistent objectives.56 
                                                                                                                      
49 See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 57–78 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 79–103 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. 
53 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 50 
(1978). 
54 Am. Bar Ass’n, Report on Antitrust Policy Objectives 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Antitrust Goals], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin- 
istrative/antitrust_law/report_policyobjectives.authcheckdam.pdf. 
55 Id. 
56 See Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy 70 (2007). 
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B. Antitrust’s Historical Goals 
 With the Supreme Court’s gloss, section 1 of the Sherman Act 
punishes “unreasonable” restraints of trade.57 Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act prohibits a company to “monopolize” or attempt or conspire to 
monopolize “trade or commerce.”58 Section 7 of the Clayton Act pro-
hibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect “may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”59 Unlike other 
countries’ antitrust statutes,60 U.S. antitrust laws do not identify specific 
objectives. An “unreasonable” restraint ultimately reflects a normative 
judgment about what is unreasonable. 
 Nor does the legislative history identify a single objective.61 Hof-
stadter, for example, categorized antitrust’s goals as (1) economic 
(competition maximizes “economic efficiency”), (2) political (antitrust 
principles “intended to block private accumulations of power and pro-
                                                                                                                      
57 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
58 Id. § 2. 
59 Id. § 18. 
60 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. I (P.R.C.), available at http:// 
www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm (stating that the 
law was enacted “for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, 
protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding 
the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy development 
of the socialist market economy”); Competition Act of 1998 § 2 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/ca1998149.pdf. The South African Competition 
Act of 1998, for example, states that the purpose of its competition law is: 
[T]o promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order (a) to 
promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; (b) to 
provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; (c) to pro-
mote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Af-
ricans; (d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world 
markets and recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; (e) to 
ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportu-
nity to participate in the economy; and (f) to promote a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disad-
vantaged persons. 
Competition Act of 1998 § 2 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_ 
act/ca1998149.pdf; Int’l Competition Network, Competition Enforcement and Con-
sumer Welfare—Setting the Agenda 14 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 ICN Survey], avail-
able at www.atp.nl/nma/image.php?id=146&type=pdf. 
61 Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What 
Else Counts?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191, 1191 (1977). 
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tect democratic government”), and (3) social and moral (competitive 
process was “disciplinary machinery” for character development).62 
 Antitrust’s political, social, and moral goals were salient after 
World War II, given the cartels in Nazi Germany colluding with U.S. 
firms.63 Congress, in passing section 7 of the Clayton Act and its 1950 
Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger amendment, “was concerned with arrest-
ing concentration in the American economy, whatever its cause, in its 
incipiency.”64 Congress’s fear was “not only of accelerated concentra-
tion of economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to 
other values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.”65 
 In reviewing the Sherman Act’s legislative history, the Supreme 
Court has noted Congress’s noneconomic concerns about the concen-
tration of wealth and power in the hands of a few.66 In different cases 
over the years, the Court has stated that Congress sought to: 
• prevent the concentration of markets through acquisitions,67 and 
“perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible 
cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effec-
tively compete with each other”;68 
                                                                                                                      
 
62 Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 199–200; see also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Consti-
tution: A Biography 412 (2005) (discussing how the direct election of U.S. senators was 
to “counter the undue effects of large corporations, monopolies, trusts, and other special-
interest groups in the Senate election process”); Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction 
of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary 
Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 469, 503–04 
(2011); Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency, 
Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete, in The Goals of Competition Law 132 (Daniel 
Zimmer ed., 2012). 
63 See Wendell Berge, Cartels: Challenge to a Free World 8–9 (1946); F.A. Hay-
ek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents—The Definitive Edition 187–92 
(2007); Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmit-
ting Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Anti-
trust Laws, S. Doc. No. 75-173, at 1 (1938) [hereinafter Message from President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt], reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal Anti-
trust Laws and Related Statutes 3404, 3404 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) (“[The] lib-
erty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point 
where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.”). 
64 See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966). 
65 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962); H.R. Rep. No. 81-1191, 
at 8 (1949) (prohibiting relationships that deprive rivals of a fair opportunity to compete); 
Kenneth M. Davidson, Reality Ignored: How Milton Friedman and Chicago Eco-
nomics Undermined American Institutions and Endangered the Global Economy 9 
(2011). 
66 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 18–19. 
67 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 333–34. 
68 Id. at 316 n.28; see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) 
(“Like the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 
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• protect firms’ “right of freedom to trade”;69 
• promote consumer welfare, allocative efficiency, and price compe-
tition;70 
• “protect the public from the failure of the market”;71 
• preserve economic freedom72 and the freedom for each business 
“to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and in-
genuity whatever economic muscle it can muster”;73 
• condemn practices that “completely shut[] out competitors, not 
only from trade in which they are already engaged, but from the 
opportunities to build up trade in any community where these 
great and powerful combinations are operating under this system 
and practice”;74 
                                                                                                                      
1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American econ-
omy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business.”); United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that it is “possible, because of 
its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent 
for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those 
engaged must accept the direction of a few”). 
69 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
70 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) 
(noting “antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); 
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (stating that “Con-
gress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’” (quoting Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979))); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (observing that antitrust laws 
“assure customers the benefits of price competition”); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the “primary goal of antitrust law is to maxi-
mize consumer welfare by promoting competition among firms); L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. 
Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law is designed to protect con-
sumers from the higher prices—and society from the reduction in allocative efficiency—
that occurs when firms with market power curtail output.”); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1444–45 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing allocative efficiency as 
synonymous with consumer welfare and as “the central goal of the Sherman Act”); J. Allen 
Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998); 
Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (noting 
that “‘the purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare’” (quoting Reazin 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1990))). 
71 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1993). 
72 Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538; Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health 
Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 
896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003); Sigmapharm, Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d 660, 672 
(E.D. Pa. 2011). 
73 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
74 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 n.15 (1984) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 63-627, at 13 (1914)). 
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• “secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against 
evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through 
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade”;75 and 
• “be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserv-
ing free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”76 
 Although concerned about higher prices and less initiative from 
monopolies, courts have also expressed social and political concerns 
over monopolies, including concern about their ability to impoverish 
individuals of their livelihood.77 Even if monopolies were beneficent, 
they limited opportunity and liberty.78 
                                                                                                                      
75 Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 
512 (1923). 
76 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 104 n.27 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)). 
77 Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 274 (“From this country’s beginning there has been an 
abiding and widespread fear of the evils which flow from monopoly—that is the concentra-
tion of economic power in the hands of a few.”); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 
322 U.S. 533, 553–54 (1944) (“‘Trusts’ and ‘monopolies’ were the terror of the period. 
Their power to fix prices, to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and 
to concentrate large power in the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of nu-
merous evils ascribed to them.”); Bepex Corp. v. Black Clawson Co., 713 F.2d 202, 204 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (“One freedom which the colonists sought in 1776 was freedom from monopo-
lies.”); Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 427 (stating that Congress was not necessarily actuated by 
economic motives alone and was also concerned about monopolies’ indirect social and 
moral effects); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(noting that monopolies “deprive the public of the services of men in the employments 
and capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well as themselves” 
(quoting Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837))). The Northern District of 
Iowa, in the 2011 case of United States v. Vandebrake, said: 
Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many 
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or 
caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed 
men. The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and social minded 
is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. 
771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 1000 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 
334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.) 1263 (observing that, as monopolies flourish, workers, who main-
tain for their families, “will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary”); 
Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch.) 350 (finding that monopolies deprive 
the public of the services and labors of a useful member of society). 
78 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 421 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The basic economic policy of the Nation is one favoring competitive markets 
in which individual entrepreneurs are free to make their own decisions concerning price 
and output.”). 
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C. The Quest for a Single Antitrust Goal 
 Although economists were ambivalent in 1890 toward the Sher-
man Act,79 and even though the Act’s legislative history encompassed 
noneconomic concerns,80 in the past policy cycle, Judge Richard Pos-
ner, Judge Robert Bork, and other Chicago School scholars pursued a 
quest for a single unifying economic goal.81 According to these schol-
ars, antitrust’s whole task was “the effort to improve allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either 
no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”82 
 Their economic goal was consistent with their largely static con-
ception of competition, strong belief in the rationality of market par-
ticipants, skepticism over the likelihood and extent of market failures, 
and doubts about the government’s institutional capacities.83 With faith 
in lightly regulated markets, they saw a limited role for antitrust and, 
accordingly, marginalized antitrust’s political, moral, and social goals.84 
By the early 2000s, Judge Posner surmised, 
Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today— 
whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed 
observer—not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust 
laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees 
on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition 
and Its Practice 58 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that concepts of allocative efficiency and 
deadweight loss “were almost certainly not known to the framers of the Sherman Act”); 
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 3 (1982) 
(“A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long and hard, on 
July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison, for any econo-
mist who had ever recommended the policy of actively combating collusion or monopoli-
zation in the economy at large.”). 
80 Some scholars have addressed the Sherman Act’s legislative history, including Judge 
Robert Bork’s interpretation and the criticisms. See Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust His-
tory, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 879, 882–83 (1990) (addressing Bork and his critics); Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpre-
tation Challenged, 50 Hastings L.J. 871, 889–94 (1999) (addressing Bork’s analysis of con-
gressional intent behind the Sherman Act). 
81 Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1, 4 (1982) (pointing to scholars who have concluded that economic efficiency is anti-
trust’s overriding goal). 
82 Bork, supra note 53, at 91; see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, at viii–ix 
(2d ed. 2001). 
83 See Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 71–73 (summarizing the Chicago School’s theo-
ries); Adams & Brock, supra note 40, at 282–93 (same). 
84 See Markham, supra note 37, at 280. 
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used to determine the consistency of specific business prac-
tices with that goal.85 
 Despite Posner’s assertion, the U.S. antitrust community never 
agreed that antitrust’s goals were only economic or that antitrust only 
had one goal—to promote economic welfare.86 Instead, other scholars 
recognized antitrust’s multiple objectives.87 Other scholars, for exam-
ple, identified, among antitrust’s traditional aims, that: (1) private eco-
nomic power, like all absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious 
to public welfare; (2) such power must be decentralized to protect a 
free society from its abuse; (3) competitively structured markets diffuse 
private power and discipline economic decision making; and (4) anti-
trust policy is critical to preserving competitive markets.88 While serv-
ing as Chairman of the FTC during the Clinton administration, Robert 
Pitofsky referred to antitrust’s noneconomic goals.89 As he earlier 
wrote, “It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain po-
litical values in interpreting the antitrust laws,” and any antitrust policy 
that excluded such political values “would be unresponsive to the will of 
                                                                                                                      
85 Posner, supra note 82, at ix; see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 
F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., writing for the majority) (“The allocative-efficiency 
or consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and aca-
demic, in the antitrust field.”). 
86 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in How the 
Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Anal-
ysis on U.S. Antitrust 51, 56 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (noting the disagreement with-
in the antitrust community over “whether economic efficiency should be the sole norm in 
antitrust or whether efficiency should be balanced against other norms such as consumer 
welfare and/or the promotion of small business”). 
87 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 65, at 37; Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Anti-
trust in Distressed Industries, 77 Antitrust L.J. 277, 277, 281–96 (2010) (examining differ-
ent schools of antitrust thought); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New 
Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140, 1182 (1981) (identifying antitrust’s four major his-
torical goals as “(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to com-
pete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition 
process as market governor”); Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from 
Antitrust and Beyond, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 113, 117 (2000). 
88 Adams & Brock, supra note 40, at 262–79; see also Joseph W. Burns, A Study of the 
Antitrust Laws: Their Administration, Interpretation and Effect 341 (1958) 
(“Concern over excessive growth of private economic power and its social and political 
implications is built into every member of the structure of antitrust policy, including sec-
tion 7.”); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 422, 424 (1965). 
89 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, Address at the American Antitrust Institute Con-
ference: An Agenda for Antitrust in the Twenty-first Century ( June 15, 2000), http://www. 
ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.shtm. 
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Congress.”90 Similarly, antitrust lawyers never agreed that antitrust’s 
sole goal is promoting Posner’s conception of economic welfare.91 For 
example, just two years after Posner’s assertion, the ABA explicitly dis-
cussed antitrust’s social and political objectives.92 
 Although unsuccessful with Congress,93 the Chicago School influ-
enced the Reagan94 and Bush95 administrations and the courts.96 The 
debate over antitrust’s goals shifted, though not completely,97 to the 
                                                                                                                      
 
90 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1051–52 
(1979) (stating that one political value underlying the Sherman Act was a “fear that excessive 
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures”); see also 
William E. Kovacic, Module 1: Origins and Aims of Competition Policy, ICN (May 2011), http:// 
www.icnblog.org/ftc/ftc-1-module-4-28-11/player.html (discussing the Sherman Act’s politi-
cal and economic objectives). 
91 See, e.g., Doug Melamed, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney of DOJ’s Antitrust Div., 
Sherman Act Section 2 Joint Hearing: Understanding Single-Firm Behavior—Conduct as 
Related to Competition 16 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/ 
docs/070508trans.pdf (characterizing hearings as an “unbounded exercise for a public 
policy class at the Kennedy School” with the different views stemming from differences in 
assumptions about antitrust’s purpose). 
92 Antitrust Goals, supra note 54. 
93 Anna Cifelli Isgro, Antitrust Reform: DOA Reagan’s Plan Rankles Business Lobbies, Con-
sumer Groups, and Congressman Rodino, Fortune (Mar. 31, 1986), http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/03/31/67320/index.htm. 
94 William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 618, 
630 (1983) (announcing that the DOJ “will consider only those factors that, according to 
economic theory or empirical evidence, relate to the ease and profitability of collusion” and 
noting that “An industry trend toward concentration is not a factor that will be considered, 
even though it has been used in the past”). As now Chief Justice John Roberts said at the 
time, the Reagan administration’s “antitrust enforcement activities parallel our general con-
cern with excessive regulation.” Memorandum from John Roberts to the Attorney General 
(May 6, 1982), http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc004. 
pdf. 
95 Competition officials during the last Bush administration stated that the “promotion 
of consumer welfare and the organization of the free market economy are the only goals 
of its antitrust laws . . . with other economic or social objectives better pursued by other 
instruments.” Int’l Competition Network, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral 
Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-
Created Monopolies 31 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICN Report], available at http://www. 
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf. 
96 Markham, supra note 37, at 264–65 (“[T]he antitrust laws in the United States began 
a steady process of judicial erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly conflicting policy 
objectives, distilling in their place the exclusive purpose of promoting consumer welfare 
through allocative and dynamic efficiency.”). 
97 See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing that “[t]he Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the 
name of efficiency, has cast aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are 
designed to safeguard more than efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions 
not only compensate the injured, but also deter wrongdoers”); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 
F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing section 2’s goal, to curb the excesses of monopo-
lists and near-monopolists, as “the equivalent in our economic sphere of the guarantees of 
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economic sphere.98 The primary policy debate was whether to apply a 
total or consumer welfare standard.99 Likewise, in the past policy cycle, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged antitrust’s economic goals, but not 
its political, social, and moral goals.100 For example, the Court recently 
praised monopoly prices as an inducement for innovation.101 One dis-
trict court, following the Supreme Court’s dictum, went further afield 
in announcing that “the purpose of antitrust laws is not to prevent mo-
nopolies . . . .”102 This, of course, is squarely inconsistent with the Clay-
ton Act, which prohibits practices and mergers “that tend to create a 
monopoly.”103 But it shows how far some courts have strayed from anti-
trust’s historical goals. 
                                                                                                                      
free and unhampered elections in the political sphere” and stating that “[j]ust as democ-
racy can thrive only in a free political system unhindered by outside forces, so also can 
market capitalism survive only if those with market power are kept in check”). Judge Har-
lington Wood, Jr., in the 1983 case of MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., said: 
While efficiency and consumer welfare are laudable goals, they should not be 
permitted to entirely eclipse a major aim of the antitrust laws: the promotion 
of competition. To advance efficiency ahead of competition in the hierarchy of 
antitrust values is to slight the non-economic dimension of the Sherman Act’s 
concern with competition. 
708 F.2d 1081, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
98 Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 
56 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, 1062 (2003) (noting that, in the past generation, courts have em-
phasized economic efficiencies to the exclusion of noneconomic objectives); Rudolph J.R. 
Peritz, Foreword, Antitrust as Public Interest Law, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 767, 771–72 (1990) 
(stating that traditional goals such as “the abatement of unfair competition, a strong pref-
erence for individual entrepreneurs, the disfavor of monopoly profits, a distrust of firms 
with great economic power, and a recognition of competition as a process with social, eco-
nomic, and political returns” were “shoved into the archives of antitrust history”). 
99 See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Pro-
tecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 208 (2008) (arguing 
that Congress’s overriding concern “was with protecting purchasers from paying supra-
competitive prices,” and that “antitrust policy can and should take business welfare into 
account in those few situations that help businesses but do not cause consumers to pay 
supracompetitive prices”); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for 
Antitrust Enforcement, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Fall 2007, at 205, 206 (discussing the de-
bate among senior DOJ Antitrust Division economists over a total versus consumer surplus 
standard); Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, J. Econ. Persp., Sum-
mer 2007, at 155, 157 (describing the debate as maximizing “consumer surplus, total sur-
plus (total welfare), or some weighted average of producer plus consumer surplus” and 
arguing that “the proper objective of antitrust should be total, not consumer, surplus”). 
100 See supra note 70. 
101 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. 
102 Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 n.5 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
103 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–14, 18 (2006). 
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D. ICN Members’ Multiple Goals 
 During the past policy cycle, while the United States sought a sin-
gle economic antitrust goal, other countries enacted competition laws 
with more antitrust objectives. The ICN recently completed three sur-
veys of its member competition authorities to identify their countries’ 
antitrust objectives. As the ICN found, the “objectives of competition 
laws vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. . . . [P]arallel objec-
tives, possibly conflicting with that of economic efficiency or consumer 
welfare, are present in many competition laws.”104 
 In its first survey, the ICN asked about the countries’ objectives of 
their laws prohibiting monopolistic behavior. Ten objectives emerged: 
• Ensuring an effective competitive process, 
• Promoting consumer welfare, 
• Enhancing efficiency, 
• Ensuring economic freedom, 
• Ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises, 
• Promoting fairness and equality, 
• Promoting consumer choice, 
• Achieving market integration, 
• Facilitating privatization and market liberalization, and 
• Promoting competitiveness in international markets.105 
 In the second survey of thirty-three jurisdictions, the main antitrust 
objectives were the promotion of competition, economic efficiency, and 
increasing consumer welfare.106 Included within these terms were other 
goals such as guaranteeing “equal conditions for all enterprises in the 
market.”107 
 The third survey, conducted in 2011, explored fifty-seven coun-
tries’ conception and application of one oft-cited goal, promoting con-
sumer welfare.108 Consequently, the reality facing international firms 
                                                                                                                      
104 Int’l Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition Policy Report 32 
(2002) [hereinafter ICN Advocacy Report], available at http://www.internationalcompet- 
itionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf. 
105 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, Annex A. 
106 Turkish Competition Auth., International Competition Network Report on 
Interface Between Competition Policy and Other Public Policies 44 (2010), available 
at http://www.icnistanbul.org/Upload/Materials/SpecialProject/SP_BackgroundReport. 
pdf. 
107 Id. at 7 (identifying one of Barbados’s primary objectives). 
108 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 2. 
568 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:551 
today is that various policy goals exist. Antitrust goals that prevail in one 
jurisdiction are not necessarily as important in other jurisdictions. 
II. Shortcomings of the Current Goals to Unify  
Antitrust Policy 
 As Part I discusses, U.S. antitrust policy historically recognized 
multiple goals. In the last policy cycle, however, some sought to limit 
antitrust to a single economic goal. This Part examines why four oft-
cited economic goals neither unified antitrust policy nor significantly 
improved antitrust analysis.109 Section A examines the goal of an “effec-
tive competitive process” and the difficulties in reaching a unified ap-
proach as to what constitutes an effective competitive process.110 Sec-
tion B addresses several difficulties with promoting consumer welfare as 
the primary goal, including the disagreement over the phrase’s mean-
ing, how to quantify consumer welfare, and how to promote it.111 Sec-
tion C then explores why enhancing efficiency, as a goal, never unified 
antitrust policy.112 More specifically, Section C examines the difficulties 
in measuring different types of efficiencies and the problems associated 
with applying enhancing efficiency as antitrust’s primary goal. Section 
D addresses why promoting economic freedom cannot be antitrust’s 
primary goal.113 Finally, Section E examines the effect that the pursuit 
of a single economic goal had on antitrust in the last policy cycle and 
identifies six paradoxes that the past policy cycle created.114 
A. Why Ensuring an Effective Competitive Process Never  
Unified Antitrust Policy 
 U.S. courts have remarked that the “purpose of antitrust law, at 
least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive 
process.”115 Similarly, all but one of the competition agencies surveyed 
by the ICN, cited “[e]nsuring an effective competitive process” as an 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 
59, 60–61 (2010); Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1421–73; infra notes 115–287 and 
accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 115–129 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 130–180 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 181–260 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 261–272 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra notes 273–287 and accompanying text. 
115 Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Tal v. 
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 
963 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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objective of the monopolization laws.116 Presumably, no one advocates 
an “ineffective” competitive process. 
 This goal fails, however, as it simply shifts the debate to a larger, 
unresolved issue, namely defining an “effective competitive process.”117 
No consensus exists in the United States or elsewhere on an effective 
competition process or a unifying theory of competition.118 Antitrust 
becomes a tautology. The goal of competition law is “promoting com-
petition by discouraging anti-competitive behaviour.”119 
 What constitutes an effective competitive process varies by audi-
ence.120 Among the goals cited by the ICN-surveyed agencies were pro-
tecting consumers,121 encouraging creativity in business activities,122 
achieving efficiency and fairness to small and medium-sized enter-
prises,123 and safeguarding jobs.124 Entrenched firms may emphasize 
promoting their freedom to contract, choosing their distributors or 
retailers, and not dealing with their competitors. Domestic competitors 
may advocate protecting choice for consumers to insulate themselves 
from more efficient international competitors.125 Entrepreneurs may 
emphasize greater access to the marketplace. Consumers may want it 
all: lower prices, greater choices, better quality, more innovation, all the 
while preserving their jobs and pay structure at domestic firms. 
                                                                                                                      
116 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, at 6. 
117 See id. at 8 (noting the Chilean Competition Tribunal’s response “that while the on-
ly objective of competition policy is to promote and protect competition, one of the main 
difficulties is to define legally what ‘free competition means,’ or to articulate why competi-
tion itself should be protected”). 
118 Stucke, supra note 43, at 110–11 (discussing how any theory of competition depends 
on its assumptions, the validity of which can vary across industries and time); Policy Brief: What 
Is Competition on the Merits?, OECD ( June 2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/ 
37082099.pdf (noting that the term “competition on the merits” has “never been satisfacto-
rily defined,” which has “led to a discordant body of case law that uses an assortment of ana-
lytical methods,” which in turn has “produced unpredictable results and undermined the 
term’s legitimacy along with policies that are supposedly based on it”). 
119 CUTS Ctr. for Competition, Inv. & Econ. Regulation, Towards a Healthy 
Competition Culture . . . , at i (2003) [hereinafter CUTS], available at http://www.cuts-
international.org/THC.pdf. 
120 Id. 
121 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, at 7. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 For example, certain developing nations noted that transnational companies “enjoy 
advantages over domestic firms because of their size, reach and control over intellectual 
property (technologies, brands, copyright etc).” CUTS, supra note 119, at 17. One neces-
sity of competition policy, as envisioned by CUTS, is “to prevent these firms from unfairly 
exploiting these advantages.” Id. 
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 Nor can policymakers define an “effective competitive process” by 
its desired effects—lower costs and prices, improved quality and ser-
vices, greater choice, and more innovation. These desired competitive 
effects can conflict. The Supreme Court, for example, stresses the im-
portance of price competition.126 Yet the Court recently accepted 
higher prices (and diminished intra-brand competition) for more ser-
vices (and potentially more inter-brand competition).127 Higher prices, 
at times, are needed for innovation.128 Accordingly, the objective of an 
effective competitive process is simply a belief in other objectives that can 
conflict.129 
B. Why Consumer Welfare Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
 In the past antitrust policy cycle, U.S. courts increasingly identified 
consumer welfare as a historic antitrust concern.130 The irony is that, 
before 1975, the Court never mentioned “consumer welfare” in an anti-
                                                                                                                      
126 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (“‘Low 
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are 
above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.’” (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. 
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990))); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107–08 (1984) (stating that “restraint that has the effect of reducing 
the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with 
this fundamental goal of antitrust law” and that “[r]estrictions on price and output are the 
paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to pro-
hibit”); see also Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(observing that “price cutting is a practice the antitrust laws aim to promote”); Wallace v. 
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he goal of antitrust law is 
to use rivalry to keep prices low for consumers’ benefit. Employing antitrust law to drive 
prices up would turn the Sherman Act on its head.”); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China 
Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 404 n.78 (D.N.J. 2010) 
(stating that the “goal of antitrust law is to create the maximum market competition be-
twe
rices alone are 
not 
e from using the patented invention with the “avoidance of monopolies which 
stifl itant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful 
Arts
en the sellers of the same goods and, hence, to drive the price on these goods as much 
down as possible”). 
127 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895–96 (2007); Jacobs 
v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Higher p
the ‘epitome’ of anticompetitive harm . . . . Rather, consumer welfare, understood in the 
sense of allocative efficiency, is the animating concern of the Sherman Act.”). 
128 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215–16 (2003) (explaining the need to balance 
encouraging innovation by rewarding inventors with the right to exclude others for a lim-
ited tim
e competition without any concom
’”). 
129 See CUTS, supra note 119, at i. 
130 See supra note 70. 
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trust case.131 Despite its pleasant democratic ring (who, after all, advo-
tes
e the dominant terms of antitrust discourse 
ith
                                                                                                                     
ca  hindering consumer welfare?), it too suffers infirmities. 
1. No Consensus Exists on What Consumer Welfare Actually Means 
 In 1987, one scholar remarked that the terms efficiency and con-
sumer welfare “have becom
w out any clear consensus as to what they exactly mean” and that con-
sumer welfare “is the most abused term in modern antitrust analy-
sis.”132 This remains true today.133 
 Although thirty of thirty-three countries in the 2007 ICN survey 
identified consumer welfare as an antitrust objective, most did “not 
specifically define consumer welfare and appear[ed] to have different 
economic understandings of the term.”134 Similarly, the 2011 survey, 
although finding “some agreement” among the fifty-seven surveyed 
competition authorities, identified significant differences.135 Only sev-
en of the fifty-seven authorities agreed with the provided definition of 
consumer welfare.136 Most (thirty-eight of the fifty-seven) antitrust au-
thorities had “no explicit definition” of consumer welfare.137 Some con-
sidered consumer welfare as “a natural result of enforcement activities 
but not necessarily an underlying goal.”138 Under this definition, anti-
 
131 United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 131 n.1 (1975) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Correspondent banking, like other intra-industry interaction among firms or 
their top management, provides an opportunity both for the kind of education and shar-
ing of expertise that ultimately enhances consumer welfare and for ‘understandings’ that 
inhibit, if not foreclose, the rivalry that antitrust laws seek to promote.”). The term con-
sumer welfare appeared more frequently in books during the past antitrust policy cycle. See 
infra App., Fig. 10. 
132 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and 
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1020, 1032 (1987). 
133 Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 85 (noting the term’s ambiguity); Barak Y. Orbach, The 
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 133, 134 (2010) (observing 
that “academic confusion and thoughtless judicial borrowing led to the rise of a label [con-
sumer welfare] that 30 years later has no clear meaning”); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is 
the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 336, 347 (2010) (noting the confusion over meaning of “aggregate” 
and “consumer” welfare standards); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, The Next Challenges 
for Antitrust Economists, Remarks at the NERA 2010 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar 
18 ( July 8, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf (noting that 
many different ideas exist as to how to promote consumer welfare). 
134 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, at 9. 
135 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 4–6. 
136 Id. at 18 nn.34–35 (consumer welfare “relates only to consumer surplus” and ex-
cludes “non-economic considerations”). 
137 Id. at 19 & n.37. 
138 Id. at 10. 
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trust enforcers promote consumer welfare whenever they act (or do 
not act). Others defined consumer welfare broadly to include “safe-
guarding the competitive process,” which in turn encompasses both 
price and non-price dimensions.139 France included “enhancing the 
om
[d]ebate continues over whether the Supreme 
generality that incorporates different social, political, economic, and 
moral values. Bork’s definition of consumer welfare differs from that of 
oth
      
c petitive process, . . . stimulating an efficient allocation of resources 
and preventing unchecked market power” within its conception of 
promoting consumer welfare over the long-term.140 
 Competition authorities are not the only bodies who disagree over 
the meaning of consumer welfare. The U.S. Antitrust Modernization 
Commissioners (AMC), after three years, could not reach unanimity on 
the term.141 In 2007, the Commissioners issued a 449-page report on 
how “antitrust law and enforcement can best serve consumer welfare in 
the global, high-tech economy that exists today.”142 But the debate be-
fore and within the AMC was “about the precise definition of ‘con-
sumer welfare.’”143 The “
Court implicitly adopted the goal of allocative efficiency or the goal of 
preventing wealth transfers as the standard by which consumer welfare 
should be measured.”144 
 Consequently, consumer welfare means different things to different 
people. As F.A. Hayek observed, the welfare of a people “cannot be ade-
quately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of ends, a 
comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is 
given its place.”145 Consumer welfare is not a well-defined goal but a 
er scholars.146 For Judge Patricia Wald and others, the phrase con-
                                                                                                                
dentified other 
goa
t mutually exclusive, include the distribution of income). 
odernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 1 (2007) 
[he ort], http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation 
/am
ings L.J. 959, 962–66 
 
139 Compare id. (reporting that some countries view promoting consumer welfare as a 
natural result of competition), with id. at 11–12 (reporting that countries i
ls, such as maintaining effective competition, as distinct from consumer welfare). 
140 Id. at 10; see also Elzinga, supra note 61, at 1193 (discussing how efficiency and eq-
uity, although no
141 The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created pursuant to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051–11060, 116 Stat. 
1766, 1856–59. 
142 Antitrust M
reinafter AMC Rep
c_final_report.pdf. 
143 Id. at 26 n.22. 
144 Id. at 43 n.19. 
145 Hayek, supra note 63, at 101. 
146 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & Econ. 
7, 7–48 (1966) (defining consumer welfare as the “maximization of consumer wealth or 
consumer want satisfaction”); Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were 
Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 Hast
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sumer welfare “surely includes far more than simple economic effi-
ciency.”147 Other academics discuss, within the definition of consumer 
welfare, maintaining allocative efficiency, preventing wealth transfers, 
and preserving consumer choice.148 Given the varying definitions of 
consumer welfare that exist, it is not surprising that courts have reached 
inconsistent results based on their conception of consumer welfare.149 
2. Difficulty in Identifying the Consumer 
 If antitrust’s goal is to promote consumer welfare, then a dispute 
arises over how to define the consumer. If the consumer is anyone who 
uses economic goods,150 or “refers to all direct and indirect users who 
are affected by the anticompetitive agreements, behaviour or mergers 
in question,”151 then everyone—from the poorest individual to the 
wealthiest corporate monopoly—is a consumer.152 The consumer wel-
fare standard then becomes a total welfare standard, which raises sepa-
rate concerns over the distribution of wealth.153 If the consumer, how-
ever, is said to include poor individuals but exclude wealthy monopolies 
(and other corporate purchasers of goods and services), then the defi-
                                                                                                                      
(199
nde, supra note 80, at 889–957 (defining consumer welfare 
as c
 Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 231 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 
198
016, 1033–34 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(sta
ly), with Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 536 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that monopoly). 
t 
whe ere it is spent. E-mail from Stephen Martin, 
Pro
9) (stating that consumers not only seek competitively priced goods, but also focus on 
quality, variety, and safety); La
oncerned with both efficiency and distributive considerations). 
147 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
6) (Wald, J., concurring). 
148 Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Inte-
grated Handbook 12–16 (2d ed. 2006). 
149 Compare Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1
ting that antitrust laws in promoting consumer welfare do not protect rivalry to obtain 
a monopo
 the Sherman Act protects rivalry to obtain 
150 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 268 (11th ed. 2008) (defining “con-
sumer”). 
151 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 32. 
152 One problem with the argument that producers are consumers is that the welfare 
measures used in industrial organization are almost exclusively partial equilibria: econo-
mists look at consumer and producer surplus in the software industry, in the auto industry, 
and so on. For example, if one measures a software CEO’s welfare as producer surplus in 
the software industry, and that same CEO’s consumer surplus in all the other markets in 
which the CEO makes purchases, one ends up counting surplus twice: once in the marke
re it is earned and again in the markets wh
fessor of Econ., Purdue Univ., to Maurice Stucke, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Tenn. Coll. 
of Law; Senior Fellow, Am. Antitrust Inst. (Sept. 11, 2011, 9:41 PM) (on file with author). 
153 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 27. 
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nition becomes more political and subjective.154 Therefore, the way in 
hic
n Act until it harms consumer welfare.”155 This is 
ognized difficulties and lim-
atio
w h the consumer is defined leads to different interpretations of the 
consumer welfare standard. 
3. Operational Difficulties 
 Some U.S. courts say that the “reduction of competition does not 
invoke the Sherma
nonsense. Courts have not arrived at a shared, specific definition of 
consumer welfare. Even if they did, courts cannot value, consistent with 
the rule of law, how much competition can be reduced before harming 
consumer welfare. 
 One rule of law concern is that quantifying consumer welfare is 
itself impracticable, if not impossible. Twenty-eight percent of the 
countries in the 2011 ICN survey believed that quantifying consumer 
harm is “not possible.”156 Of those who believed it possible to quantify 
detriment to consumer welfare, they all rec
it ns to such a quantification.157 Thus, requiring an antitrust plaintiff 
to show when a reduction in competition harms consumer welfare is 
illogical when “no easy, non-contestable, method for quantifying harm 
to consumer welfare” currently exists.158 
 A second rule of law concern is the constraints on data availability 
to undertake this review. Suppose, for example, courts adopted as their 
definition of consumer welfare, “the individual benefits derived from 
the consumption of goods and services.”159 Under this definition, “in-
                                                                                                                      
154 See id. at 32; Carlton, supra note 99, at 158 (stating that the perception of antitrust 
as “protecting innocent individuals from evil corporate empires is misleading” as “[m]ost 
tran
mey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 
136
Survey, supra note 60, at 40. 
ter OECD Glossary], available at http://www.oecd.org/data 
oecd/8/61/2376087.pdf. 
sactions in the U.S. economy are between firms”). 
155 Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rebel 
Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)); Templin v. Times Mirror 
Cable Television, Inc., No. 94-55002, 1995 WL 314607, at *2 (9th Cir. May 22, 1995); Ice 
Cream Distribs. of Evansville, LLC v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. 09-5815 CW, 
2010 WL 3619884, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 
No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Streamcast Net-
works, Inc. v. Skype Techs., S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fox v. Good 
Samaritan Hosp., No. C-04-00874RMW, 2007 WL 2938175, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007); 
Perry v. Rado, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (E.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d, 343 F. App’x. 240 (9th 
Cir. 2009); J. Allen Ra
4 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
156 2011 ICN 
157 Id. at 41. 
158 Id. at 88. 
159 OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition 
Law 29 (1993) [hereinaf
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dividual welfare is defined by an individual’s own assessment of his/her 
satisfaction, given prices and income”; accordingly, measuring con-
sumer welfare “requires information about individual preferences.”160 
Measuring individual preferences is itself difficult. One cannot rely en-
rely
or quality, and 
the
                                                                                                                     
ti  on consumers’ choices, as consumers at times choose poorly and 
contrarily to their long-term interests.161 Moreover, consumer welfare, 
if measured on the individual level, does not address restraints and 
mergers that increase some consumers’ welfare, while decreasing oth-
ers’ welfare. 
 Some economists adopt consumer surplus162 to measure consumer 
welfare.163 But consumer surplus is seen as synonymous with static price 
competition that is of limited use in industries with dynamic competi-
tion.164 Thus, the ICN-surveyed countries generally did “not seem to 
wish to be tied to a formal definition of consumer welfare as consumer 
surplus, and certainly not if consumer surplus is given a narrow defini-
tion and confined to price, without due consideration f
o r economic criteria.”165 Furthermore, “there is considerable debate 
over the degree to which [surplus] corresponds to more theoretically 
appealing measures of consumer welfare.”166 Ultimately, proving that 
consumers were harmed often involves significant labor, time, and oth-
er costs and the necessary data is not always available.167 
 A third rule of law concern is predictability and objectivity. Taking 
the mantra that the “antitrust law aims to protect competition, not 
competitors,” courts begin their analysis of antitrust injury “from the 
viewpoint of the consumer.”168 A “prototypical example of antitrust in-
jury” is that consumers “had to pay higher prices (or experienced a re-
 
of Choice: When Choice Im-
pair
stances, such as the price one 
is wi
 note 60, at 18 nn.34, 35 (reporting that seven of the fifty-
seve es do so). 
9. 
see also Orbach, supra note 133, at 160–62. 
a 
Gas Cir. 1987)). 
160 Id. 
161 See, e.g., Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side 
s Social Welfare, 25 J. Pub. Pol’y & Marketing 24, 26 (2006). 
162 Consumer surplus is the “excess of social valuation of product over the price actu-
ally paid,” and “is measured by the area of a triangle below a demand curve and above the 
observed price.” OECD Glossary, supra note 159, at 28. Suppose for example, after a long 
hike, you were willing to pay $2 for a cold Diet Coke. At the local store, you paid 50¢. Your 
consumer surplus was therefore $1.50. What consumers are willing to pay (and the amount 
of consumer surplus) can fluctuate depending on the circum
lling to pay for an umbrella on rainy versus sunny days. 
163 2011 ICN Survey, supra
n survey countri
164 See id. at 1
165 Id. at 26. 
166 OECD Glossary, supra note 159, at 28; 
167 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 45. 
168 Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Albert
 Chems., Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1241 (3d 
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duction in the quality of service) as a result of a defendant’s anticom-
petitive conduct.”169 This standard is feasible when defendants illegally 
fix the price of consumer goods or services. But proving this kind of 
antitrust injury in many other antitrust cases, such as when an en-
trenched firm eliminates a start-up through exclusionary means, is 
harder. Nor can an antitrust plaintiff prove that consumer welfare was 
reduced; instead, a plaintiff “must prove that the challenged conduct 
affected the prices, quantity, or quality of goods or services and not just 
his own welfare.”170 As a circuit court judge and a law professor ob-
served, this requires the antitrust plaintiff to engage in a “speculative, 
oss
hat, 
eca
                                                                                                                     
p ibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis of how the restraints’ 
efficiencies and inefficiencies affect the ill-defined consumer.171 This 
analysis, as the ICN found, engenders “a relatively high degree of un-
certainty in estimations or assumptions used for quantification of det-
riment to consumer welfare.”172 
 Some courts equate a reduction of consumer welfare with an in-
crease in price or reduction in quality.173 This, however, says nothing 
about other important facets of competition (such as variety or innova-
tion). For example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, under its narrow conception of consumer welfare, dismissed 
an antitrust complaint, in part because “reduced innovation as a result 
of defendants’ conduct does not create an inference of raised con-
sumer prices or reduced output.”174 Courts cannot simply assume t
b use prices did not increase and output did not decrease as a result 
of the restraint, consumer welfare was not diminished.175 One cannot 
assume that generalist courts can determine “how much restraint of 
competition is in the public interest.”176 Such a “shifting, vague, and 
indeterminate” standard would put courts into a “sea of doubt.”177 
 Consequently, consumer welfare provides little guidance as an an-
titrust goal. Although some courts, particularly those in the Ninth Cir-
 
997) 
(qu 7 F.3d 308, 312–13 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). 
rs are assured competitive price and quality.’” (quoting Rebel Oil Co., 51 F.3d at 
143
. 2d 997, 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898). 
169 Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
170 Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1
oting Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 8
171 Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 109, at 87. 
172 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 43. 
173 Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘Consumer 
welfare is maximized when economic resources are allocated to their best use and when 
consume
3)). 
174 Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp
175 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 44. 
176 United States v
177 Id. at 283–84. 
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cuit, require a showing that the restraint adversely impacts consumer 
welfare, this cannot be taken literally. The “connection between con-
sumer welfare and the practical enforcement of competition law is not 
always straightforward,” concluded the 2011 ICN survey; “there may be 
a considerable gap between policy statements and practice.”178 Con-
sumer welfare for some agencies “provides general, underlying, con-
ceptual guidance rather than a technical test for enforcement in prac-
tice.”179 Although consumer welfare is frequently mentioned as a policy 
goal, there eans or 
ho
e use of the efficien-
cies defense in merger cases, the “trend among lower courts is to rec-
the ICN 
sur hirty-three competition authorities cited it as an 
ltim
                                                                                                                     
remains no consensus on what the term actually m
w  the consumers are. Furthermore, under any of the current defini-
tions, there remains “no easy, non-contestable method for quantifying 
harm to consumer welfare that will work for all cases.”180 
C. Why Enhancing Efficiency Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
 Courts have cited enhancing efficiency as an antitrust goal.181 But 
the legal status of efficiency as antitrust’s primary goal is weaker.182 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not sanctioned th
ognize the defense.”183 Enhancing efficiency ranked third in 
vey (twenty of the t
u ate goal).184 It too has a pleasant ring. (After all, who advocates 
promoting inefficiency?) It too suffers infirmities. 
 
Survey, supra note 60, at 3. 
ive’” (quoting Broad. 
Musi
fficiency, in 
How
C. Cir. 2001). No court to date has 
perm fense. 
eport, supra note 95, at 12. 
178 2011 ICN 
179 Id. at 19. 
180 Id. at 45. 
181 See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 289–90 (1985) (stating that whether to apply Court’s per se illegal rule turns on 
“whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to 
restrict competition and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to ‘increase eco-
nomic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competit
c, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979))). 
182 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that the effi-
ciency defense—whereby merging parties can defend a merger by showing that it is creat-
ing significant efficiencies in the relevant market, thereby offsetting any anticompetitive 
effects—is “not entirely clear” as a legal matter); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. 
Lande, The Chicago School’s Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not E
 the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, supra note 86, at 89, 93–94. 
183 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.
itted a merger based on an efficiencies de
184 2007 ICN R
578 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:551 
1 he Term Efficiency Is Not Self-Defining, But Encompasses 
Different Concepts 
 As the ICN noted, “Efficiency is a broad economic term that may 
refer to allocative efficiency (allocation of resources to their most effi-
cient use), productive efficiency (production in the least costly way), or 
dynamic efficiency (rate of int
. T
roduction of new products or improve-
niques).”185 
 agencies did not specify which 
ffic
 (especially in dynamic industries) is that one cannot accu-
ls, the merger’s impact on 
ncies. Although the 2010 
er
tion.190 
                                                                                                                     
ments of products and production tech
 Many of the surveyed competition
e iencies were their goals.186 Indeed some efficiencies (dynamic) can 
be more important than others (productive).187 What is important for 
our purposes is that an antitrust policy that focuses on maximizing one 
type of efficiency (e.g., productive) will not necessarily maximize other 
efficiencies (e.g., dynamic).188 
2. Difficulties in Measuring Efficiency 
 As one scholar observes, “Practical difficulties of courtroom proof 
severely limit implementation of efficiency goals, however impor-
tant.”189 Ideally if maximizing efficiency were the goal, the competition 
authority would calculate accurately the net present value of each effi-
ciency (e.g., value of new technologies) and inefficiency (e.g., disincen-
tives to innovate post-merger, increase in waste) from the merger, and 
the likely efficiencies/inefficiencies if the merger were prohibited. The 
problem
rately calculate, given current economic too
allocative, productive, and dynamic efficie
M ger Guidelines are an improvement in incorporating non-price 
dimensions on competition, the new Guidelines, as FTC Commissioner 
J. Thomas Rosch observed, still lack a clear framework for analyzing a 
merger’s impact on innovation, variety, and other non-price competi-
 
icy Roundtables: Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis 10 
(20
 on 
Con nds Ministry of Economic Affairs: What Is Compe-
titio .justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 OECD, Pol
07) [hereinafter OECD Dynamic Efficiencies], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/ 
22/40623561.pdf. 
188 See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ, Address at the Seminar
vergence Sponsored by the Netherla
n? 4–5 (Oct. 28, 2002), http://www
189 Brodley, supra note 132, at 1028. 
190 Rosch, supra note 133, at 7–10. 
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a. Difficulties in Measuring Allocative Efficiency 
 Courts, in particular the Ninth Circuit, state that “an act is deemed 
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allo-
cative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels 
or diminishes their quality.”191 The first problem, which these courts 
never address, is that the term allocative efficiency has different mean-
ings.192 
 The Ninth Circuit appears to define allocative efficiency as “when 
economic resources are allocated to their best use.”193 Its definition of 
callo ative efficiency can be construed as perfect price discrimination: 
each consumer pays the highest price that consumer is willing to pay 
(reservation price), and there is no deadweight welfare loss.194 Although 
acceptable for some economists, others find this price discrimination 
(and paying higher prices) unfair.195 Another problem is that price dis-
crimination, with several exceptions, is illegal.196 
 Another definition of allocative efficiency is Pareto efficiency, 
whereby “resources are so allocated that it is not possible to make any-
one better off without making someone else worse off.”197 But this defi-
ition n cannot serve as the policy goal. As Judge Richard Posner ob-
served, Pareto efficiency “has few applications to the real world.”198 
Many mergers make someone worse off: competitors (by making the 
merged entity more efficient), suppliers and distributors (by eliminat-
ing them or making the terms less favorable), and customers (by im-
posing higher prices, reduced variety, and less innovation). 
 One response is whether a more efficient, Pareto optimal outcome 
“can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those who 
are made better off to those who are made worse off, so that all end up 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 79, at 83 (calling allocative efficiency a “more theoretical 
and fferent economists and philosophers prefer[ing] dif-
fere
m. Econ. Rev. 728, 735 (1986) (finding that ninety-one percent of individuals 
surv
c. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 554–56 (1990) (discussing when price dis-
crim olates the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13
d. 2011). 
191 Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433 (emphasis omitted); see also Hilton v. Children’s Hosp. San 
Diego, 315 F. App’x. 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2008). 
192 Hovenkamp, 
 controversial concept” with “di
nt definitions”). 
193 See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. 
194 See Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 109, at 92. 
195 Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the 
Market, 76 A
eyed thought charging higher prices to those more dependent on the product was 
offensive). 
196 Texaco In
ination between a wholesaler and retailer vi
(a) (1988)). 
197 OECD Glossary, supra note 159, at 65. 
198 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 17 (8th e
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no worse off than previously.”199 For example, a merger that harms 
some consumers could still be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement when, hy-
pothetically, the beneficiaries from the merger would be willing to car-
ry out the transaction even if they had to compensate the victims. But 
ote
g, marketing, and prod-
uct differentiation, which are at times useful. Also, pricing at marginal 
cost leaves little room for companies to invest in innovation.204 “As Jo-
seph Schumpeter first taught us,” a former DOJ official said, “produc-
p ntial Pareto superiority fails on two levels: (1) trying to assess how 
the merger would affect the welfare of individuals and firms not before 
the court is beyond the district court’s capabilities and (2) “Kaldor 
compensation principle works as a one off shot, but fails in situations 
where multiple detriments occur to the same group of people.”200 
 Some view allocative efficiency as “leading firms to produce output 
up to the point where the marginal cost of each unit just equals the 
value of that unit to consumers.”201 This has, at least, two problems. 
First, a product’s marginal cost, courts have recognized, “is notoriously 
difficult to measure and ‘cannot be determined from conventional ac-
counting methods.’”202 Second, reducing price to marginal cost is not 
always desirable. Many branded products (from your morning coffee to 
evening cocktail) are priced above marginal cost and enjoy some mar-
ket power.203 So an antitrust goal of promoting marginal cost pricing 
conceivably would justify restricting advertisin
                                                                                                                      
199 OECD, Regulatory Policy and The Road to Sustainable Growth 15 (2010), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/41/46270065.pdf. 
200 Phil Evans, In Search of the Marginal Consumer: The FIPRA Study 18 
(2008); see also Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of 
an 
of Kal-
dor
ell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(sta
ginal cost or, because marginal cost is often impossible to ascertain, be-
low
. 
Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in Economic Theory and 
Competition Law 93, 103–06 ( Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009) (discussing criticisms 
-Hicks as a normative criterion for economic analysis of legal rules when gains and 
losses are distributed unevenly among population). 
201 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Effi-
ciencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 Antitrust L.J. 207, 208 (2003). 
202 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ne. Tel. 
Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981)); Pac. Eng’g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 1977). Because marginal cost cannot be determined 
from conventional accounting methods, courts in predatory pricing litigation use average 
variable cost as a surrogate. Hanson v. Sh
ting that predatory pricing “could be shown by evidence that Shell was selling its gaso-
line at below mar
 average variable costs”). But one criticism is that average variable cost is a “poor surro-
gate.” Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 373. 
203 Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1425, 1464. 
204 See 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 30 (noting how Australia points out that an-
titrust must account for firms’ earning sufficient returns to invest and innovate)
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ti and dynamic efficiencies are at least as important as static allocative 
efficiency in promoting economic growth.”
ve 
 innovation will diminish. But, as discussed above,206 
predicting a merger’s impact on price and non-price competition is 
lt to verify and quantify, in part because much of 
e i
205 
 To simplify further, courts can assess whether the restraint on trade 
will diminish allocative efficiency. Courts can examine whether the 
price will rise above the competitive level, or whether the quality, ser-
vice, variety, or
often difficult. 
b. Difficulties in Measuring Productive Efficiencies 
 As the antitrust agencies recognize, a merger’s likely productive 
efficiencies “are difficu
th nformation relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of 
the merging firms.”207 
 As the agencies have found, “efficiencies projected reasonably and 
in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized.”208 Indeed 
many mergers fail to deliver the promised efficiencies.209 Many biases 
and heuristics can affect the decision to enter into a merger or acquisi-
tion. For example, “myopia, loss aversion, endowment effects, status 
quo bias, extremeness aversion, overoptimism, hindsight bias, anchor-
ing heuristics, availability heuristics, framing effects, representative bias, 
saliency effects” can all adversely affect the merger analysis and imple-
mentation.210 Many of these biases and heuristics frequently result in 
                                                                                                                      
205 William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ, Address at the International 
Bar Association’s Conference on Competition Law and Policy in a Global Context, Com-
parative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for Antitrust Agencies—New and 
Old speeches/10845.htm. 
-
pare cted to cause is quite difficult”). 
tegories of mergers are “more likely to 
dest lder value”). 
ler, supra note 209, at 878. 
(Mar. 18, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
206 See supra notes 155–180 and accompanying text. 
207 DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg; Policy 
Brief: Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies 1, OECD (Sept. 2008), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
55/48/41359037.pdf [hereinafter OECD Policy Brief] (reporting that, “even in a static anal-
ysis, determining whether a merger is likely to lead to efficiencies and how they will com
 with any anti-competitive effects the merger is expe
208 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 207, § 10. 
209 Davidson, supra note 65, at 64; Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust and Effi-
ciency: A Comment, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1116, 1117 n.8 (1987) (highlighting earlier studies); 
Clayton M. Christensen et al., The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar. 
2011, at 49, 49 (reporting that “study after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acqui-
sitions somewhere between 70% and 90%”); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance 
and Competition Policy, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 833, 873–79 (2011) (examining evidence 
from corporate finance that suggests that entire ca
roy, rather than enhance, shareho
210 Wal
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value destroying transactions.211 Executives in behavioral studies have 
been shown to be overconfident in their ability to manage a company, 
have systematically underestimated their competitors’ strength, and 
have been prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g., taking 
credit for positive outcomes and blaming the environment for negative 
outcomes).212 Not only do many mergers fail to yield significant effi-
en
cies measure up against any 
nti-
volutionary biology 
perspective, “[L]arge economic concentrations such as monopolies 
f their overall efficiency 
nd 
                                                                                                                     
ci cies, but the merger process itself, while benefitting investment 
bankers, antitrust lawyers, and economic experts, can misallocate re-
sources and divert managerial talent “from creating things of real val-
ue.”213 
 Consequently, as one roundtable of competition authorities found, 
“Making a prospective determination about whether a merger will lead 
to static efficiencies and how such efficien
a competitive effects that the merger is expected to cause can be very 
challenging.”214 Given these challenges, agency lawyers and economists 
can differ over whether the merging parties verified the efficiencies de-
fense to otherwise problematic mergers.215 
 Finally, allowing mergers to yield productive efficiencies can lessen 
dynamic efficiency and endanger the overall economic system.216 As a 
veteran antitrust enforcer recently argued from an e
and oligopolies are vastly overrated in terms o
a positive impacts on the current economic system, and . . . their 
dangerous impacts are increasingly underrated.”217 
 
n We Learn from the Experimental Literature 6 J. In-
stit
tial divergence in the 
effic
ncy Paradox, in How the Chicago School Overshot 
the
211 Id. 
212 Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations, in Be-
havioral Economics and Its Applications 235, 246, 260–64 (Peter Diamond & Hannu 
Vartiainen eds., 2007). There are several recent surveys of the empirical literature. See 
Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, Compe-
tition Pol’y Int’l, Spring 2010, at 3, 9–12; Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Econom-
ics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 65, 71–74 (2011); Christoph Engel, The 
Behaviour of Corporate Actors: How Much Ca
utional Econ. 445, 449–50 (2010). 
213 Adams & Brock, supra note 209, at 1121. 
214 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 187, at 9. 
215 Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, FTC, Economic Issues: Merger Effi-
ciencies at the Federal Trade Commission: 1997–2007, at 26 (2009), available at www. 
ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf (noting “substan
iency acceptance rate” between FTC lawyers and economists). 
216 See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficie
 Mark, supra note 86, at 77, 81. 
217 Horton, supra note 62, at 473. 
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c. Difficulties in Measuring Dynamic Efficiencies 
 Dynamic efficiencies arise when firms innovate and “foster techno-
logical change and progress.”218 Although most important in improv-
ing society’s well-being, dynamic efficiencies are the most difficult to 
measure.219 
 One difficulty is in determining when innovation benefits society. 
Innovation involves introducing something new, “a new idea, method, 
or device.”220 But not everything new is necessarily good. For example, 
some financial innovations touted in the 1990s were heavily criticized 
for contributing to the financial crisis.221 So, promoting dynamic effi-
ciency really means promoting socially beneficial innovations. The 
problem is distinguishing between socially beneficial and harmful in-
ovan tion for goods and services that are still under development and 
have not reached the market.222 A restraint may hinder innovation 
(such as preventing new subprime mortgages that profit banks but 
worsen the consumers’ financial condition), but leave society better off. 
 A second difficulty is in measuring dynamic efficiency. In the 1990s, 
the antitrust agencies offered a narrow view of an “innovation market,” 
namely “research and development directed to particular new or im-
proved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research 
and development.”223 But this assumes that the input—specialized re-
search and development (R&D) assets or characteristics of specific 
firms—is a good proxy for the output, socially beneficial innovation.224 
There are also problems in using outputs to measure innovation. Pat-
ents and copyrights are both under-inclusive in measuring innovation 
                                                                                                                      
218 OECD Glossary, supra note 159, at 23. 
219 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 187, at 10 (noting “the uncertainty in-
herent in innovative activity regarding its cost, timing, and the likelihood and extent of its 
commercial success, difficulties in measuring innovation itself, the problem of how to con-
ceptually transform innovation into some measure of welfare, and informational asymme-
try between the merging parties and the enforcement agencies”). 
220 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 591 (1979) (defining innovation). 
221 Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. 
Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe, at 
ix–x (2009). 
222 Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge Is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the Con-
sumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 Antitrust L.J. 677, 698 
(2010); OECD Policy Brief, supra note 207, at 5 (recognizing the “almost always uncertainty 
about how much innovative activity will cost, how long it will take and the likelihood and 
extent of its commercial success”). 
223 DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty § 3.2.3 (1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf. 
224 See OECD Policy Brief, supra note 207, at 5 (recognizing a host of complicating factors 
related to innovation). 
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(i not capturing processes and products not subject to intellectual 
property protection) and over-inclusive (not every patent or copyright is 
socially beneficial). 
 A third difficulty is in determining what hinders or promotes in-
novation and to what extent greater concentration/market power fos-
ters more innovation.
n 
 predict higher prices and less innova-
on
 Consequently, despite the importance of dynamic efficiency, anti-
trust policy still lacks adequate tools to measure it or assess the long-
term effects of many restraints on dynamic efficiency.230 
                                                                                                                     
225 The 2010 Merger Guidelines provide addi-
tional guidance of when mergers are likely to “diminish innovation 
competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail innovative ef-
forts below the level that would prevail absent the merger.”226 But the 
Guidelines leave many issues on evaluating a merger’s impact on inno-
vation unresolved.227 At times, the competition agencies, as part of 
their competitive effects analysis,
ti  post-merger.228 Given the difficulties in measuring and predicting 
dynamic efficiencies, the agencies seldom challenge mergers solely on 
dynamic efficiency grounds.229 
 
225 See Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come from: The Natural History of 
Innovation 21 (2010) (discussing how openness and connectivity may be more important 
for innovation than competition); Stucke, Government Prosecute Monopolies?, supra note 17, 
at 509–17. 
226 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 207, § 6.4. 
227 Rosch, supra note 133, at 9–10; see also Darren S. Tucker & Bilal Sayyed, The Merger 
Guidelines Commentary: Practical Guidance and Missed Opportunities 1, 11–12, Antitrust 
Source (May 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_ 
source/May06_Tucker5_24f.authcheckdam.pdf (noting the significant omission of innova-
tion in the agencies’ 1992 guidelines and 2006 commentary). 
228 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, In re Koninklijke DSM N.V., Roche Holding AG, & Fritz 
Gerber, 137 F.T.C. 1 (2004) (No. C-4098), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/ 
dsmrochecomp.pdf (alleging, among the acquisition’s anticompetitive effects, its reducing 
the parties’ “incentives to improve service or product quality, or to pursue further innova-
tion in the relevant market”); DOJ & FTC, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines 18 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247. 
htm#42 (stating that antitrust agencies “generally focus on the likely effects of proposed 
mergers on prices paid by consumers,” but, at times, allege anticompetitive effects on non-
price dimensions in their complaints). 
229 See 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 60, at 31 (noting one country’s observation that 
“in reality, the time horizon of reliable analysis often does not make it plausible to take 
into consideration long term effects, even if the broader conceptual framework would 
allow that”). 
230 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 207, § 10 (“Other efficiencies, such as 
those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally 
less susceptible to verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output reduc-
tions.”). 
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3. How Current Antitrust Analysis Is Incomplete in Focusing on Some 
Efficiencies (Such as Short-Term Productive Efficiencies) and Not 
Other Efficiencies and Inefficiencies 
 Efficiencies today are used as a shield, namely as a defense to an 
otherwise anticompetitive merger.231 But if promoting efficiency, as 
some courts say, is antitrust’s primary goal, then preventing inefficiency 
should be the sword. Courts and agencies—besides permitting mergers 
that yield efficiencies—should block mergers that yield greater ineffi-
ciencies. 
 Conceivably, a merger may yield either greater efficiencies or inef-
ficiencies.232 Accordingly, if market forces do not prevent mergers that 
yield greater inefficiencies, then antitrust enforcers and courts should 
calculate and weigh the multiple efficiencies and inefficiencies arising 
from a merger. To do so, they need the tools to assess the likely alloca-
tive, productive, and dynamic efficiencies and inefficiencies that arise 
from each merger. They must also have the tools to weigh the efficien-
cies and inefficiencies (including their impact on the poor, whose mar-
ginal utility of income differs from wealthier consumers), along with 
the other benefits, costs, and risks posed by the merger. The problem, 
however, is that no such tools exist today.233 
 Why don’t these tools exist? One reason is that neither the anti-
trust agencies nor courts consider inefficiencies and other significant 
costs and risks from a merger, which, although less susceptible to quan-
tification, can inflict greater harm. Why don’t the competition agencies 
then consider the inefficiencies and bring them to the courts’ atten-
tion? One explanation is that promoting efficiency is not their primary 
                                                                                                                      
231 Id. 
232 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many 
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, dis-
courages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and 
rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to 
counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”); OECD Glossary, supra 
note 159, at 86 (discussing inefficiency when a monopoly faces less incentive or competi-
tive pressure to minimize costs of production and increase the wasteful expenditures in 
things “such as maintenance of excess capacity, luxurious executive benefits, political lob-
bying seeking protection and favourable regulations, and litigation”); see also Roger Frantz, 
X-Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency: What Have We Learned?, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 434, 434 
(1992); Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency,” 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 392, 
412–13 (1966). 
233 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 187, at 1 (reporting on the “general 
agreement that proving a specific likelihood of claimed dynamic efficiencies and measur-
ing their impact are difficult tasks for which there are no easy approaches. At present, 
quantitative assessments do not appear to be feasible.”). 
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antitrust goal. But if it is, another explanation is that the agencies and 
courts believe in neo-classical economic theories premised on rational 
market participants. If one strongly believes that market participants 
are rational profit-maximizers, one can logically conclude that firms 
merge to maximize profits either legally (through productive or dy-
namic efficiencies and other lawful means (e.g., tax benefits)) or ille-
gally (by lessening competition). If the government cannot prove that 
the merger will lead to more market power (e.g., prices post-merger 
will increase above competitive levels), then the merger by default must 
maximize profits through legal means (e.g., efficiencies).234 Accord-
ingly, there is greater concern over false positives than negatives.235 
 This bipolar outlook does not acknowledge the vast grey, middle 
area of mergers (e.g., AOL-Time Warner and Daimler-Chrysler), in 
which bounded rational executives were overconfident about efficien-
cies or sought to build empires for their own egos (e.g., acquisitions of 
Hollywood movie studios).236 Market forces do not always punish the 
overconfident firms whose mergers destroy shareholder value. Conse-
quently, it is easier to endorse an efficiency goal if one makes simpli-
fied, unrealistic assumptions about competition (static price competi-
tion) and market participants (rational, self-interested, fully informed). 
 If promoting efficiency indeed were the goal, current antitrust 
analysis would be incomplete and at times would lead to bad outcomes 
for the public. In recent closing statements, for example, the DOJ high-
                                                                                                                      
234 See DOJ Notice: 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26823-03 ( June 29, 1984) (stat-
ing that “most mergers do not threaten competition and that many are in fact procompeti-
tive and benefit consumers”); Davidson, supra note 65, at 72–73, 78–79; Adams & Brock, 
supra note 40, at 292 (quoting Reagan’s first head of the DOJ Antitrust Division as saying that 
“[m]erger activity in general, is a very, very important feature of our capital markets by which 
assets are continuously moved into the hands of those managers who can employ them effi-
ciently” and that interfering with mergers “would be an error of very substantial magni-
tude”); Debra A. Valentine, Gen. Counsel, FTC, Remarks at the 10th Annual OWIT Trade 
Conference, Global Mergers: Trade Issues and Alliances in the New Millennium, (Oct. 4–5, 
1999), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvwiitmerger.shtm (“Most mergers are moti-
vated by goals of efficiency and improved performance, and from an antitrust perspective 
are at least competitively benign.”). 
235 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 879 (recognizing that its per se antitrust rules provide 
guidance to the business community and minimize the burdens on litigants and the judi-
cial system, while also noting the risk of false positives from its per se rules in “prohibiting 
procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and 
the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct 
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))). 
236 Wu, supra note 36, at 225. 
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lighted the likely efficiencies from mergers in the highly concentrated 
telephone,237 satellite radio,238 and airline239 industries. But the DOJ 
considered only one type of efficiency, namely short-term productive 
efficiency gains, and only those efficiencies that the merging firms 
identified. Overall, the DOJ closing statements never addressed the 
mergers’ impact on dynamic efficiency or potential long-term costs. 
 As one example, the DOJ predicted that Whirlpool’s acquisition of 
Maytag, which reduced the number of major appliance manufacturers 
in the United States from four to three, was unlikely to reduce competi-
tion substantially.240 The DOJ predicted that “any attempt to raise 
prices likely would be unsuccessful.”241 Instead, consumers would bene-
fit from the merger’s estimated cost savings and other efficiencies.242 In 
reality, the DOJ was wrong. Consumers ended up paying more (about 
five to seven percent more for Maytag dishwashers and about seventeen 
percent more for Whirlpool dryers) and had fewer choices post-
m ger.er
merging parties’ efficiencies defense. To utilize efficiency as a goal, 
                                                                                                                     
243 
 The reality today is that courts and agencies cannot maximize effi-
ciency as a goal unless they undertake a more extensive review. They 
cannot consider only some efficiencies (e.g., productive) that are easier 
to measure (e.g., combining all the manufacturing post-merger in the 
one modern low-cost production facility). They cannot rely on the 
 
237 Press Release, DOJ, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Thomas O. Barnett Re-
garding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T’s Acquisition of Bellsouth: Investigation 
Concludes That Combination Would Not Reduce Competition (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/218904.pdf. 
238 Press Release, DOJ, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its 
Decision to Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius 
Satellite Radio Inc.: Evidence Does Not Establish That Combination of Satellite Radio Pro-
viders Would Substantially Reduce Competition (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf. 
239 Press Release, DOJ, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on 
Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air Lines Inc. and Northwest 
Airlines Corporation (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/ 
2008/238849.htm. 
240 Press Release, DOJ, Department of Justice Antitrust Division Statement on the Clos-
ing of Its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case 
Study of Maytag-Whirlpool 16 (NBER Working Paper No. 17476, 2011), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1857066. 
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courts and agencies would have to devote more attention to the harder 
to quantify, yet significantly more important, dynamic (in)efficiencies.244 
 Ironically, an efficiency goal would make the courts and agencies 
more skeptical about mergers yielding efficiencies; they would display 
greater concern over false negatives than they do currently over false 
positives. Many times, efficiencies do not seem to motivate the merger.245 
The efficiency claims are mostly developed by antitrust lawyers and 
hired experts, who sift through the company’s documents and data or 
extrapolate from the company’s past experiences.246 Thus, an efficiency 
goal, logically, could lead to more active merger enforcement, whereby 
only those mergers in which the efficiencies are substantiated and likely 
to occur are permitted. 
4. Rule of Law Concerns if Promoting Efficiency Is Antitrust’s Goal 
 If promoting efficiency is antitrust’s primary goal, any legal pre-
sumption raises the risk of false positives and negatives. Accordingly, 
the legal analysis must remain case- and fact-specific. This lessens pre-
dictability and increases compliance costs and rule of law concerns.247 
 Predicting the dynamic, allocative, and productive efficiencies 
from the challenged merger (or restraint) affords the agencies, courts, 
and defendants ample discretion, with little assurance of accuracy, con-
sistency, objectivity, and transparency. Nations differ widely “as to how 
economic efficiency itself can be best achieved, depending in part on 
the different comparative advantages of the economy concerned.”248 
 A merger, for example, may yield significant dynamic or produc-
tive efficiencies but higher prices.249 Some consumers may value lower 
                                                                                                                      
 
244 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 187, at 10 (stating that, although compe-
tition authorities want dynamic efficiency considerations to feature more frequently and 
prominently in merger decisions, the “real-world problem is that no one has figured out a 
robust way to do that yet, and rather than engage in speculation, courts have tended to 
avoid dynamic efficiency analysis in cases where it could have been relevant”). 
245 Given dynamic efficiencies’ importance in providing a competitive advantage, it is 
surprising that merging firms have “tended to ignore dynamic efficiencies, too.” Id. at 11. 
246 U.S. DOJ & FTC, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 51 
(2006) [hereinafter 2006 Guidelines Commentary], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm. 
247 Hayek, supra note 63, at 114. 
248 Richard Bronk, Which Model of Capitalism?, OECD Observer, Summer 2000, at 12, 
13, available at http://249.pressflex.net/news/fullstory.php/aid/345/Which_model_of_ 
capitalism_.html. 
249 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 207, § 6 (reporting that “merger may in-
crease prices in the short term but not raise longer-term concerns about innovation, either 
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priced homogenous goods, while others are willing to pay more for 
greater innovation in the industry. In different industries and societies, 
different efficiencies (e.g., dynamic, productive, and allocative) can 
increase (or decrease) citizens’ well-being to differing degrees.250 The 
goal of promoting efficiency does not inform the agencies and courts 
on how to make these trade-offs, and there is often no way to deter-
mine whether they made the proper trade-off.251 
 Promoting efficiency would require judges and agencies to engage 
in industrial policy, rather than to secure compliance with existing 
competition laws. As the Supreme Court stated nearly forty years ago, 
“[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic prob-
lems.”252 Also, Congress never intended the courts to decide antitrust 
cases based on the courts’ conception of the latest economic think-
ing.253 Not only are the courts and agencies politically unaccountable 
for their industrial policies, they are ill-equipped to resolve the complex 
economic issues that competition cases raise.254 “The judicial power 
involves the responsibility for interpreting and administering the law 
and settling disputes,” noted one judge; “[r]esponsibility for resolving 
economic issues is a matter for the legislative branch of the Govern-
ment.”255 
                                                                                                                      
because rivals will provide sufficient innovation competition or because the merger will 
generate cognizable research and development efficiencies”). 
250 Brodley, supra note 132, at 1026–27. 
251 Carlton, supra note 99, at 159 (stating that, if “one adopts a (short run) total sur-
plus standard (or long run consumer surplus standard), it will be more difficult to verify 
whether agency officials are achieving their objectives”). 
252 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). 
253 S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, Control of Corporations, Persons, and 
Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 62-1326, at 10 (1913) (writing in 
response to the Court’s enunciation of its rule-of-reason standard in 1911 that “[i]t is in-
conceivable that in a country governed by a written Constitution and statute law the courts 
can be permitted to test each restraint of trade by the economic standard which the indi-
vidual members of the court may happen to approve”), reprinted in The Legislative His-
tory of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes, supra note 63, at 999, 
999; see also Mises, supra note 56, at 43 (observing that the “characteristic feature that dis-
tinguishes [the constitutional state] from despotism is that not the authorities but the duly 
elected people’s representatives have to decide what best serves the commonweal”). 
254 For example, in one 1950s survey of judges, twenty-two thought it desirable for 
courts to resolve the economic issues that antitrust cases raise, nineteen found it undesir-
able, ten provided qualified responses, five tended toward a favorable answer, three felt it 
preferable for antitrust cases heard in an administrative proceeding in the first instance, 
two thought it desirable that at least some of the economic issues be determined by a non-
judicial body. Burns, supra note 88, at 11. 
255 Id. 
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5. Problem of Efficiency as a Normative Goal 
 Maximizing efficiency, from a utilitarian perspective, does not nec-
essarily promote overall well-being. There comes a point at which the 
marginal cost from the incremental efficiency gain outweighs its benefit. 
 Moreover, aside from the utilitarian cost-benefit framework, citizens 
may want to preserve other rights and values (such as economic free-
dom) for their own sakes. In rejecting a pure efficiency rationale for 
punitive damages, the Supreme Court observed that “[c]itizens and leg-
islators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in 
economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally offen-
sive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency 
is just one consideration among many.”256 Thus, if citizens (1) do not 
prize efficiency for its own sake and (2) have different thresholds at 
which they prize other values over the incremental efficiency gain, then, 
in any democracy, promoting efficiency cannot be the only goal.257 
 Antitrust policy, rather than simply promoting efficiencies, can be 
an important mechanism to disperse economic and political power and 
promote individual freedom.258 The concentration of private or gov-
ernmental economic power is problematic—not only on utilitarian ef-
ficiency grounds—given its risks to any democracy. Consequently, 
courts must acknowledge their and the antitrust agencies’ limitations. 
Promoting efficiency is a feasible goal for market fundamentalists and 
socialist central planners, who have a unifying theory of how markets 
work, how market participants behave, and how efficiency can be max-
imized. But in dynamic markets, the process is imperfectly understood; 
the outcomes are often indeterminate.259 There is no conscious design, 
no DNA from which one can estimate the probabilities of different 
outcomes, and no tools to weigh the discounted values of the efficien-
cies and inefficiencies. In reality the antitrust agencies and generalist 
courts do not know whether, or how often, they accurately assess the 
                                                                                                                      
256 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 439–40 (2001) (quoting 
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1393, 1450 (1993)). 
257 See Bronk, supra note 248, at 13 (“In the field of economics and business, the search 
for such an elusive balance has been not merely for an optimal trade-off between social 
fairness and economic efficiency but also for the most efficient model of capitalism it-
self.”). 
258 Davidson, supra note 65, at 13; Adams & Brock, supra note 40, at 271; Lawrence 
Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom 
for Antitrust?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214, 1222–23 (1977). 
259 See John Kay, Obliquity: Why Our Goals Are Best Achieved Indirectly 157 
(2011). 
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likelihood and magnitude of the allocative, productive, and dynamic 
(in)efficiencies from mergers and other restraints of trade.260 They 
have neither the tools nor knowledge to undertake this analysis. Even if 
they did, such analysis would raise significant rule of law concerns and 
could conflict with important political, social, and moral democratic 
values. 
D. Why Ensuring Economic Freedom Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
 U.S. courts have recognized the antitrust laws as a “charter of eco-
nomic liberty.”261 They protect competitors’ economic freedom to com-
pete.262 They seek to maximize the “freedom of opportunity for con-
sumers and for present and prospective businessmen as well.”263 
Ensuring economic freedom was the fourth most popular goal in the 
2007 ICN survey.264 This goal encompasses other goals in the ICN sur-
vey, such as ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enter-
prises265 and promoting fairness and equality.266 Although promoting 
economic freedom has a pleasant democratic ring, it too cannot be the 
primary goal. 
 Humans are social animals. Invariably, the exercise of economic 
freedom by some market participants will constrain the freedom of oth-
ers.267 The Court recognized, early in the Sherman Act’s history, that 
every contract among market participants conceivably restrains trade.268 
                                                                                                                      
 
260 The agencies rarely do post-merger reviews, assess to what extent the claimed pro-
ductive efficiencies were realized, or examine the merger’s impact on dynamic efficiencies 
to the extent quantifiable. Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 
Ind. L.J. 1527, 1560–63, 1574 (2011). 
261 See 21 Cong. Rec. 2461 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); supra note 76. 
262 See 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, at 14–15 (stating that, “in the United States, 
‘[a] notion of freedom—of either the dominant firm or of powerless firms—is implicit in 
many decisions’ as ‘[t]he United States antitrust law also reflects an objective to preserve 
freedom of firms, as contrasted with government regulation of firms’” (quoting Professor 
Eleanor Fox)); supra notes 69, 72, 74. 
263 Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 384 
(1965) (observing that antitrust laws “expand the range of consumer choice and entrepre-
neurial opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets of numerous buyers and sell-
ers, assuring ease of entry to such markets, and protecting participants—particularly small 
businessmen—against exclusionary practices”). 
264 2007 ICN Report, supra note 95, at 14. 
265 Id. at 17 (promoting an “equitable opportunity to participate in the economy”). 
266 Id. at 18. 
267 Id. at 16 (noting the “challenge of balancing the economic freedoms of different 
market participants”). 
268 See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898) (noting that the Sher-
man Act “must have a reasonable construction or else there would scarcely be an agree-
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A resale price maintenance (“RPM”) policy increases the manufacturer’s 
economic freedom (in setting the minimum or maximum retail price of 
its goods), while limiting the retailers’ freedom (in setting the price of 
the manufacturer’s goods). Conversely, a policy prohibiting RPM limits 
the manufacturer’s freedom, while increasing the retailers’ freedom. 
Promoting market freedom can lead to the evils that the antitrust laws 
seek to prevent, namely “monopolization, oligopolization, collusion, 
and anticompetitive mergers and ‘joint ventures.’”269 
 One classic example of this tension is Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, a 1951 Supreme Court case, in which a dominant newspaper re-
fused to accept advertising from local merchants who advertised with a 
small competing radio station.270 Because of its monopoly of local ad-
vertising in the community and its practically indispensable coverage of 
ninety-nine percent of the local residents, the newspaper forced nu-
merous merchants to stop advertising with the radio station. The mo-
nopolist asserted its economic freedom as a private business to “select 
its customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it 
pleases.”271 But, in exercising its economic freedom, the monopolist 
infringed the economic freedom of the local merchants and radio sta-
tion, which absent the restraint, would contract with one another. The 
Court did not dispute the monopolist’s general right to refuse to deal, 
but recognized: 
“[T]he word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it 
is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to 
an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are quali-
fied.” The right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute 
nor exempt from regulation. Its exercise of a purposeful 
means of monopolizing interstate commerce is prohibited by 
the Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station, equally 
with the publisher of the newspaper, is entitled to the pro-
tection of that Act.272 
 Consequently, promoting economic freedom inherently involves 
trading in some people’s freedom to promote others’. To make that 
                                                                                                                      
ment or contract among business men that could not be said to have, indirectly or re-
motely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it”). 
269 Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, and 
Government in the American Economy 304 (2d ed. 2004). 
270 342 U.S. 143, 149–50 (1951). 
271 Id. at 155. 
272 Id. (quoting Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 265 U.S. 350, 358 (1921)). 
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trade-off, one invariably relies on other values and goals besides eco-
nomic freedom. Accordingly economic freedom cannot be the primary 
goal. 
E. The End of the Policy Cycle 
 With the quest for a single economic goal, antitrust progressively 
became less relevant during the past policy cycle. Among the wreckage 
from the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession are laissez-faire 
economic beliefs.273 Judge Bork began the last policy cycle by noting 
several antitrust paradoxes.274 Today antitrust suffers greater para-
d s. 
 One current paradox is that, in its quest for a single economic goal, 
U.S. antitrust policy now lacks any clear unifying goal. No consensus ex-
ists in defining or measuring consumer welfare or designing legal stan-
dards to further this goal. Of course competition officials can agree that 
prohibiting certain egregiously anticompetitive behavior (such as price-
fixing cartels) can promote their economic goal (whether it is consumer 
welfare, efficiency, or economic freedom). But these restraints were 
condemned when antitrust recognized multiple goals. Moreover in the 
context of other coordinated conduct (such as group boycott) and mo-
nopolization, the current economic goals cannot provide
oxe
 quantifiable, 
bje
e s
                                                                                                                     
o ctive benchmarks to guide and assess antitrust policy. 
 To achieve consensus, as the ICN surveys reflect, the antitrust goal 
accordingly becomes more abstract and less meaningful. The surveyed 
competition authorities achieved greater consensus as the objectives 
became more open-ended and the relationship between the goal and 
th pecific actions necessary to promote the goal became less defined. 
 A second paradox is that, in the past decade, the Supreme Court 
has complained about the state of federal antitrust law275 (e.g., the in-
terminable litigation, inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, 
 
273 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human 
Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 2–3, 
146–48, 173 (2009); Davidson, supra note 65, at 316–17; Justin Fox, The Myth of the 
Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street 33 
(2009); John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago: After the Blowup, New Yorker, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28, 
28; Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2009, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 36, 36–37 (noting that more important than the economists’ failure to predict 
the financial crisis was “the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic 
failures in the market economy”). 
274 Bork, supra note 53, at 4, 125 (criticizing antitrust policy which does not suffi-
ciently account for productive efficiencies). 
275 See supra note 15. 
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and its fear over the unusually high risk of inconsistent results by anti-
trust courts), but it was the Court that has created this predicament. 
During the past antitrust cycle, the Court increasingly relied on its fact-
specific weighing standard, the rule of reason,276 and a vague economic 
goal (consumer welfare) that accommodated different personal values 
and interpretation and often pointed to no particular course of action. 
 A third paradox is the efficiency paradox: “[B]y trusting dominant 
firm strategies and leading firm collaborations to produce efficiency, 
modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses in-
novative challenges, and stifles efficiency.”277 Although antitrust poli-
cymakers recognize dynamic competition as more important, in the 
past policy cycle, antitrust agencies and courts “tended to avoid dy-
namic efficiency analysis,” focusing instead on a static price competi-
tion and productive efficiencies.278 Courts and antitrust agencies ap-
plied a light touch to merger review under a fear of false positives and a 
belief that most mergers promote efficiencies, even though the empiri-
cal literature suggests the contrary.279 While the efficiencies defense 
developed in the past policy cycle, antitrust enforcers and courts did 
not account for post-merger inefficiencies or competitive distortions in 
ea
        
cr ting firms too big and too integral to fail.280 
 A fourth paradox is the economic power paradox. Our constitu-
tional framework seeks to distribute power, rather than to promote its 
consolidation or concentration.281 Despite the historical concerns 
about concentrated economic power, antitrust policymakers in the last 
policy cycle “no longer concern[ed] themselves with preventing big-
ness, and indeed tend[ed] instead to encourage large-scale enterprise 
for efficiency’s sake.”282 Although, in nature, we saw the benefits of di-
                                                                                                              
276 ). 
etitive 
Id. ( t. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
rust to static price competition when dynamic 
com
0, at 1560–61; OECD Policy Brief, supra note 207, at 6. 
e 37, at 314. 
 
 California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011
[R]ule of reason weighs legitimate justifications for a restraint against any an-
ticompetitive effects. We review all the facts, including the precise harms al-
leged to the competitive markets, and the legitimate justifications provided 
for the challenged practice, and we determine whether the anticomp
aspects of the challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects. 
quoting Paladin Assocs. v. Mon
277 Fox, supra note 216, at 77. 
278 OECD Policy Brief, supra note 207, at 4; see also Davidson, supra note 65, at 85–86 
(noting the intellectual confinement of antit
petition provides the greater benefits). 
279 See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 26
280 Markham, supra not
281 See supra note 258. 
282 Markham, supra note 37, at 264.
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versity,283 we disregarded the dangers of concentration and systemic 
risk in the financial services markets, one of our most important indus-
tries.284 Despite the public and governmental concern about protecting 
small businesses from unfair competitive tactics, and the importance of 
small companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies, the Supreme 
ou
ats market participants as amoral, self-
ter
 to unprecedented govern-
ment intervention in the private sector.”287 
                                                                             
C rt now praises monopolies. 
 A fifth paradox is that, although trust, fairness, and pro-social be-
havior are vital to the functioning of a market economy,285 antitrust pol-
icy ignores these values, and tre
in ested profit-maximizers.286 
 A sixth antitrust paradox is that during the past policy cycle the 
government’s “laissez-faire policies . . . led
III. Is a Single Unifying Goal a Worthwhile Pursuit? 
 As Part II shows, identifying a single antitrust goal, such as promot-
ing consumer welfare, is easy. The open-ended objective simply shifts 
the debate to defining the term and the means of attaining that end. A 
single objective is always available; the trade-off, however, is greater ab-
straction. This Part examines whether the antitrust community should 
continue its quest for a single goal in the next policy cycle.288 Section A 
posits as an initial premise that any antitrust policy must promote indi-
vidual well-being, which in turns requires the promotion of material 
well-being and quality-of-life factors.289 Section B next contends that in 
promoting well-being, antitrust policy cannot exclude social, political, 
and moral objectives.290 It does so by examining antitrust’s inherent 
                                         
283 Horton, supra note 62, at 485. 
284 See id. at 491. 
285 Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People 19 
(2011); Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness 
and Punishment, 327 Science 1480, 1480 (2010); Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Trust and 
Finance, NBER Rep., no. 2, 2011, at 16, 17–18; see Horton, supra note 62, at 474, 476, 502, 
520 (arguing how fundamental human values of fairness and reciprocity not only enhance 
trust, but create a healthier, more stable, more efficient economic ecosystem). 
286 Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Be-
havioral Economics, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 893, 893–94 (2010); see Reeves & Stucke, supra 
note 260, at 1536–38. 
287 Markham, supra note 37, at 313 (discussing how antitrust neither prevented nor re-
dressed the recent systemic threats caused directly by companies too big and integral to 
the functioning of markets). 
288 See infra notes 288–382 and accompanying text. 
289 See infra notes 292–332 and accompanying text. 
290 See infra notes 333–382 and accompanying text. 
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tr e-offs and how noneconomic considerations can in fact strengthen 
a market economy. 
 In today’s global economy, a single, well-defined objective has ben-
efits. Nations’ differing antitrust objectives can conflict. Unless merging 
firms can carve out one jurisdiction, one country will impose its objec-
tives on another during a merger. Transparent, well-defined policy ob-
jectives can help increase convergence of the ensuing legal standards, 
harmonize enforcement among competition authorities, reduce com-
pliance costs on industries, li
ad
mit the ability of entrenched firms to se-
re
us, come from the dead, Come 
back to tell you all, I shall tell you all.’”291 Antitrust simply does not lend 
itself t
ate end. 
om
mate objectives. Third, one 
 As an initial premise, competition’s ultimate goal is to improve well-
bei
     
cu  state aid or legal barriers to protect their market power, and lower 
entry barriers for importers. 
 But, as this Part examines, the lack of a well-defined unifying goal 
is not for want of mental capacity or incentives. This is not the case in 
which we squeeze “the universe into a ball, To roll it toward some over-
whelming question, To say: ‘I am Lazar
o a single well-defined objective. 
A. As an Initial Premise, Antitrust Policy Ultimately Must Promote  
(or at Least Not Impede) Citizens’ Well-Being 
 In antitrust, competition, however defined, is not the ultim
C petition instead represents the means “to achieve broader gov-
ernment objectives for the economy or for a given industry.”292 
 If competition is not an end, but a more efficient (or democratic) 
means to achieve other goals, then three implications arise. First, there 
must be one or more ultimate goals, with perhaps other intermediary 
goals. Second, one must have a form of competition in mind, and un-
derstand how and under what circumstances one’s conception of com-
petition can promote or impede one’s ulti
must understand how the formal legal and informal institutions can 
promote one’s conception of competition. 
ng.293 Competition can be bitter, but we take such bitters to improve 
                                                                                                                 
291 T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in T.S. Eliot: Collected Poems, 
190
 
9–1962, at 6 (1991). 
292 OECD, Global Forum on Competition: Bringing Competition to Regulated 
Industries 2 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/24/34339715.pdf. 
293 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991) (predicting that 
“the concentration of the sources of information of the American people in just a few 
dominant, collaborative conglomerates . . . would be inimical to the objective of a com-
petitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic wellbeing of the 
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overall well-being, not simply to be left miserable. If, as a result of our 
competition policy, our physical and mental health deteriorates, our 
isolation and distrust increases, and our freedom and self-determination 
decrease, then the policy is not worthwhile. A competition policy, which 
simply involves a rush for scarce resources, in which many are trampled 
or left scrambling for the scraps, would appeal to the few who captured 
the resources. So our conception of competition (as defined in part by 
our competition policy) must promote (or at least not impede) overall 
well-being. 
 Some will ask whether this is too much to ask of antitrust. Let 
competition policy improve the allocation of scarce resources, reduce 
the costs of goods and services, and maximize overall wealth. Leave 
well-being to individual choice or supplementary governmental poli-
cies. We do not require other laws, such as the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration regulations on frozen cherry pies,294 to promote overall 
well-being. Why should antitrust bear this burden? 
 One premise of our economic system of private enterprise is the 
importance of free competition. The Small Business Act’s policy decla-
ration summarizes this philosophy: 
The essence of the American economic system of private en-
terprise is free competition. Only through full and free com-
petition can free markets, free entry into business, and oppor-
tunities for the expression and growth of personal initiative 
and individual judgment be assured. The preservation and 
expansion of such competition is basic not only to the eco-
nomic well-being but to the security of this Nation.295 
 This policy statement by Congress incorporates three important 
premises. First, competition does not exist independently of the legal 
and informal institutions. As economist R.H. Coase said, “[T]he legal 
system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic sys-
tem and may in certain respects be said to control it.”296 
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ment Toolkit 3 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/59/39679833.pdf 
(noting that increased com
n business opportunities to its ci
ughout the economy”). 
294 See 21 C.F.R. § 152.126 (2011). 
295 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006). 
296 R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 713, 717–18 
(1992); see also Hayek, supra note 63, at 87 (observing that competition “d
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 Second, the types of competition (fair versus unfair) can vary de-
pending on the legal and informal institutions.297 The phrase “compe-
tition on the merits” invariably involves normative considerations of 
unfair competition.298 The legal and informal institutions provide the 
rules of the game necessary for that type of competition to function 
effectively299 and thereby affect the market participants’ incentives.300 
As Douglass North notes, “How the game is actually played is a conse-
quence of the formal structure (e.g., formal rules, including those set 
by the government), the informal institutional constraints (e.g., societal 
norms and conventions), and the enforcement characteristics.”301 A 
market’s performance characteristics are a function of these institu-
tional constraints. The rules will define the opportunity set in the 
economy. Changing the rules can lead to different outcomes.302 If the 
antitrust laws reward (or are indifferent to) monopolization, monopo-
lies will be the likely outcome in markets conducive to monopoliza-
tion.303 
 Third, some types of competition (“full and free”) promote overall 
well-being. Other types of competition, such as the “exploitation of 
child labor, the chiseling of workers’ wages, the stretching of workers’ 
                                                                                                                      
all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to pre-
serve competition and to make sure it operates as beneficially as possible”). 
297 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.  § 45(a)(2) (empowering and directing the FTC to prevent per-
sons from “using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (finding that the FTC “in measuring a practice against the elu-
sive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness . . . like a court of equity, considers 
public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of 
the antitrust laws”); Hayek, supra note 63, at 86. 
298 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 
(1985) (defining exclusionary conduct as behavior that “not only (1) tends to impair the 
opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or 
does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588–89 (1957) (“[The] primary issue is 
whether du Pont’s commanding position as General Motors’ supplier of automotive fin-
ishes and fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or because its acquisition of the 
General Motors’ stock, and the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the 
insulation of most of the General Motors’ market from free competition, with the resultant 
likelihood, at the time of suit, of the creation of a monopoly of a line of commerce.”). 
299 See David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
Protecting Prometheus 232–65 (1998). 
300 Douglass C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change 158 
(2005). 
301 Id. at 52. 
302 Gerber, supra note 299, at 16. 
303 See North, supra note 300, at 50. 
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hours, are not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition”304 
and hinder well-being.305 
 Accordingly, legal institutions (including antitrust law)306 and in-
formal ethical, moral, and social norms307 can promote overall well-
being to the extent that they promote fair competition and deter unfair 
competition. Consequently, the stronger our belief in the importance 
of preserving and expanding fair competition to promote overall well-
being, the greater antitrust’s role in defining and deterring unfair 
competition. The Supreme Court describes the antitrust laws in gen-
eral, and the Sherman Act in particular, as “the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise.”308 The Court has argued that antitrust laws “are as impor-
tant to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms.”309 Thus, antitrust promotes fair competition that, in 
turn, will promote overall well-being.310 
 If antitrust’s ultimate goal is to promote well-being, we must then 
address what constitutes “well-being.” Webster’s Dictionary defines “well-
being” as “the state of being happy, healthy, or prosperous.”311 But be-
ing prosperous or healthy does not necessarily mean greater happiness. 
Well-being, as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) found, is multi-faceted. Promoting well-being entails 
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309 Id. 
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promoting (1) material well-being (income and wealth, housing, and 
jobs and earnings) and (2) quality of life (health status, work and life 
balance, education and skills, social connections, civic engagement and 
governance, environmental quality, personal security, and subjective 
well-being).312 
 Should antitrust law then promote (1) only material well-being or 
(2) both material well-being and quality of life? Advances in the litera-
ture of happiness economics will enable policymakers to tailor govern-
mental policies to promote well-being (or at least minimize sources of 
unhappiness, such as unemployment, mental illness, or inadequate 
health care).313 It is apparent, however, from the available evidence that 
one cannot maximize well-being by maximizing only one component. 
 After one’s basic needs are met, the economic literature shows, 
increasing income and wealth does not significantly increase well-
being.314 One of the few well-being metrics in which America excels is 
material well-being. The average household disposable income in the 
United States in 2008 was $37,690 per year, and average U.S. house-
hold’s financial worth was an estimated $98,440—much higher than 
the OECD averages of $22,284 and $36,808, respectively.315 Increasing 
aggregate material well-being will not necessarily increase overall well-
being.316 If a larger pie means greater wealth inequality, the wealthier 
                                                                                                                      
 
312 OECD, Better Life Initiative: Compendium of OECD Well-Being Indicators 6 
(2011) [hereinafter OECD Well-Being], available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/ 
0,3746,en_2649_201185_47916764_1_1_1_1,00.html (click “In one single file (1.5 MB)” to 
access text); see also Jon Hall et al., A Framework to Measure the Progress of Societies 14 (OECD 
Statistics, Working Paper No. 2010/05, 2010), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
economics/a-framework-to-measure-the-progress-of-societies_5km4k7mnrkzw-en (click “PDF” 
to access text). 
313 Derek Bok, The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from 
the New Research on Well-Being 51 (2010). 
314 In multivariate regressions, income, as it correlates to subjective happiness evalua-
tions, has a low coefficient. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from 
Happiness Research?, 40 J. Econ. Lit. 402, 410 (2002); see also Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., 
Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness, 319 Science 1687, 1687 (2008); Daniel Kah-
neman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life But Not Emotional Well-Being, 
107 PNAS 16489, 16491 (2010) (finding from a U.S. survey of subjective well-being that, 
beyond approximately $75,000, “higher income is neither the road to experienced happi-
ness nor the road to the relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues 
to improve individuals’ life evaluations”). 
315 Better Life Index: United States, OECD, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/ 
united-states/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
316 The economic literature, for example, does not identify a correlation between the 
doubling of wealth in the United States between 1945 and 1991 and greater happiness. 
Bok, supra note 313, at 11–12; Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Sci-
ence 29–30 (2005). Despite substantial increases in economic well-being, China’s citizens 
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will not necessarily be happier,317 and there will be greater incentives 
for the wealthy to use the law to safeguard their interests.318 Promoting 
wealth maximization (to the exclusion of other values) can also pro-
mote status competition, selfishness, and envy, and can marginalize 
other values correlated with greater happiness.319 Thus, the greater is-
sue is fairness, namely how well the resources are distributed.320 
 Income inequality in the United States increased significantly dur-
ing the past antitrust policy cycle.321 The United States has “the fourth 
highest rate of income inequality and relative poverty (17.3% of people 
[are] poor compared to an OECD average of 11.1%) in the OECD.”322 
Other policy challenges involve quality-of-life issues, such as work and 
life balance,323 social connections,324 safety,325 and environmental qual-
                                                                                                                      
are not significantly happier. Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the 
Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2006, at 3, 15 (contrasting Chi-
na’s rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2005 (“real income per capita increasing by 
a factor of 2.5”) and improvements for material well-being (e.g., “ownership of color televi-
sion sets rose from 40 percent of households to 82 percent, and the fraction with a tele-
phone jumped from 10 percent to 63 percent”), with no increase in reported life satisfac-
tion (“the percentage of people who say they are dissatisfied has increased, and the 
percentage who say they are satisfied has decreased”)). 
317 Bok, supra note 313, at 12. 
318 See Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 Antitrust L.J. 313, 339–
40 (2010). 
319 For many, well-being extends beyond satisfying one’s desires to live a moral life. On an 
individual level, the primary sources of happiness are family relationships, employment, 
community and friends, health, self-control or autonomy, personal ethical and moral values, 
and the quality of the environment. Bok, supra note 313, at 17; Layard, supra note 316, at 
62–73; Daniel Nettle, Happiness: The Science Behind Your Smile 85, 87 (2005). Proso-
cial spending is also associated with greater happiness. Lara B. Aknin et al., Prosocial Spending 
and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal 8, 13 (Harvard Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 11-038, 2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/ pdf/11-038.pdf 
(observing a positive relationship in prosocial spending and subjective well-being in 122 of 
136 surveyed countries and in an experiment involving Canadians and Ugandans). 
320 Wealth inequality was a historic antitrust concern. See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 
(1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (identifying this inequality of condition, wealth, and 
opportunity as the greatest threat to social order, and stating that this inequality “has 
grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations 
to control production and trade and to break down competition”). 
321 Stucke, supra note 318, at 334–35. 
322 Society at a Glance–OECD Social Indicators, Key Findings: United States, OECD (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/53/47573390.pdf. 
323 Better Life Index: United States, supra note 315 (“Evidence suggests that long work 
hours may impair personal health, jeopardize safety and increase stress. People in the 
United States work 1768 hours a year, higher than the OECD average of 1739 hours.”). 
324 Id. 
325 Id. (noting how the U.S. homicide rate is “higher than the OECD average and one 
of the highest in the OECD”). 
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ity, including how efficiently the United States uses its natural re-
sources.326 
 Consequently, in developed countries like the United States, an 
antitrust goal to maximize wealth (to the exclusion of other goals) will 
not necessarily increase (in fact, can even reduce) overall well-being. To 
maximize well-being, any competition policy must balance the promo-
tion of material well-being with quality-of-life factors, such as freedom 
and self-determination, while not deterring the exercise of compassion 
and interpersonal relationships. 
 Such a policy is not difficult to imagine. Competition in dispersing 
political and economic power can increase economic opportunity and 
personal autonomy,327 a key predictor of happiness.328 Citizens can 
choose to purchase from (and work for) firms that align with their per-
sonal, religious, and ethical values.329 When a firm engages in exploita-
tive, unfair behavior, a competitive market provides alternatives.330 Posi-
tive sum competition provides richer social connections as people use 
their personal “vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity” to help 
                                                                                                                      
326 Id.; see also U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, GAO-11-396, Report to Congres-
sional Addressees, Key Indicator Systems: Experiences of Other National and 
Subnational Systems Offer Insights for the United States 4–5, 12, 14 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11396.pdf. 
327 United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923). 
[The] Sherman Act was intended to secure equality of opportunity, and to 
protect the public against evils commonly incident to monopolies and those 
abnormal contracts and combinations which tend directly to suppress the 
conflict for advantage called competition—the play of the contending forces 
ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain. 
Id.; Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 
(1923) (stating that the “fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality 
of opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of 
competition through monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade”). 
328 Bok, supra note 313, at 23; Nettle, supra note 319, at 74. 
329 F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance 19 (3d ed. 1990) (“When the no-barriers-to-entry condition of perfect com-
petition is satisfied, individuals are free to choose whatever trade or profession they prefer, 
limited only by their own talent and skill and by their ability to raise the (presumably mod-
est) amount of capital required.”); see also Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 
223 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that antitrust injury includes “[c]oercive activity that prevents 
its victims from making free choices between market alternatives” (quoting Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 
(1983))); Hayek, supra note 63, at 127. 
330 See Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 9 
(1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the “central aim of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers 
against certain abusive business practices—especially price-fixing and monopoly); Kahne-
man et al., supra note 195, at 735. 
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others.331 In promoting productive and dynamic efficiencies, antitrust 
can promote sustainable consumption and production. Greater pro-
ductive efficiency can increase leisure time, which employees can use to 
contribute their unique skills to community volunteer work.332 In ena-
bling these activities, which are correlated generally with healthier and 
happier people, competition can promote well-being. 
B. Competition Policy Cannot Exclude Social, Political, and Moral Objectives 
 If maximizing well-being entails a blended approach, the next issue 
is whether antitrust should promote only economic objectives. Limiting 
antitrust to economic goals, a former FTC chair said, frees competition 
law from normative judgments: “Antitrust finally regarded enhancing 
consumer welfare as the single unifying goal of competition policy, and it 
used a framework that was based on sound economics, both theoretical 
and empirical.”333 Another antitrust official warned, “[T]he inclusion of 
other, non-competition values is very dangerous, and we need to be very 
careful with it.”334 The official cautioned against the danger of “getting 
involved in politically charged issues by reference to populism”; popu-
lism, he argued, posed a “great danger of diluting our competition 
principles.”335 If competition authorities “incorporate extraneous social 
and political values into [their] decision making,” then their “competi-
tion-based analysis will be polluted by values that, although important, 
just do not belong in sound competition analysis.”336 
 This brings to mind General Jack D. Ripper’s observation in the 
movie, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb: 
[W]ar is too important to be left to politicians. They have nei-
ther the time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic 
thought. I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infil-
                                                                                                                      
331 See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610; OECD Well-Being, supra note 312, at 14 (“Not 
only [do the availability of jobs and earnings] increase people’s command over resources, 
but they also provide people with a chance to fulfill their own ambitions, to develop skills 
and abilities, to feel useful in society and to build self-esteem.”). 
332 See Bok, supra note 313, at 20 (discussing research on how attending monthly club 
meetings or volunteering once a month is associated with a change in well-being equiva-
lent to a doubling of income). 
333 Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Devel-
opment of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 359, 388. 
334 R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ, Remarks at the International Conference 
on Competition: Competition and Politics 2 ( June 6, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/210522.pdf. 
335 Id. at 3. 
336 Id. at 6. 
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tration, Communist indoctrination, Communist subversion 
and the international Communist conspiracy to sap and im-
purify all of our precious bodily fluids.337 
 Section B.1 examines the fallacy of viewing social, moral, and po-
litical values as “diluting” antitrust analysis. Neoclassical economic the-
ory did not insulate antitrust authorities from lobbyists and political 
interest groups. Indeed Microsoft and Intel increased their lobbying 
efforts after the government commenced its antitrust prosecutions.338 
Google, currently under investigation for antitrust violations, is spend-
ing even more on lobbyists (over two million dollars between April and 
June 2011).339 AT&T and T-Mobile spent millions in lobbying politi-
cians to gain antitrust approval of their anticompetitive merger.340 De-
spite their efforts, the DOJ, several states, and two competitors chal-
lenged the merger, which the parties abandoned.341 Consequently, the 
danger lies not in the inclusion of noneconomic concerns in antitrust’s 
goals, but in the ensuing legal standard. 
1. Antitrust’s Inherent Trade-offs 
 Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limit antitrust 
to economic goals, they cannot avoid noneconomic values. Antitrust 
policy has inherent trade-offs. As Hayek noted, “It is the essence of the 
economic problem that the making of an economic plan involves the 
choice between conflicting or competing ends—different needs of dif-
ferent people.”342 To resolve the trade-offs, one invariably relies on po-
litical, social, and moral values. 
 To start with an easy case, suppose residents of a New England 
community want to preserve their downtown that consists largely of 
local merchants. They oppose the entry of a big-box retailer, which 
would primarily serve the community. The big-box retailer preaches to 
                                                                                                                      
337 Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb 
(Columbia Pictures 1964). 
338 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1447. 
339 Michael Liedtke, Google’s Lobbying Bill Tops Previous Record, Huffington Post ( July 
21, 2011, 6:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/googles-lobbying-bill-
q2–2011_n_906149.html. 
340 Maurice E. Stucke, Crony Capitalism and Antitrust, CPI Antitrust Chron., Oct. 
2011, at 2, 3. 
341 Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Issues Statements Regarding AT&T Inc.’s 
Abandonment of Its Proposed Acquisition of T-Mobile USA Inc. (Dec. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/278406.htm. 
342 Hayek, supra note 63, at 106. 
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the villagers the virtues of its lower priced, high-quality goods and in-
creased consumer surplus. The community still objects. Should the 
government dismiss the citizens’ behavior as irrational and permit the 
big-box retailer to enter the New England community? If so, govern-
ment paternalism could override community preference. 
 A competition official, when presented with this hypothetical, like-
ly would accept the consumers’ informed preference. The government, 
as the Supreme Court recognized under its state action doctrine, can 
displace competition with an anticompetitive regulatory program.343 
Here, consumers can sacrifice the benefits of increased competition for 
other objectives, such as the pleasure (and value) they derive from pre-
serving their downtown’s quaintness.344 
 The harder case involves antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs. 
Suppose a merger of the town’s paper mills generates efficiencies that 
will benefit only the company, with no prospect of being passed along 
to consumers. Also, suppose the efficiency gains (which include pur-
chasing less electricity) outweigh the likely price increase to consumers. 
Should these efficiencies be counted in favor of the merger? The Anti-
trust Modernization Commission was unable to reach a consensus.345 
Although one commissioner thought that they should be counted, oth-
er commissioners disagreed: “Any doubts that a consumer welfare stan-
dard better reflects the goals of the antitrust laws than a standard based 
on total welfare will serve only to undermine antitrust enforcement in 
the future.”346 
 Other trade-offs include (1) a potential increase in inter-brand 
competition at the expense of reducing intra-brand competition,347 (2) 
a merger’s anticompetitive effects in one market offset by pro-
competitive benefits in another market,348 (3) mergers and restraints 
                                                                                                                      
 
343 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991); Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943). 
344 See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Classic antitrust analysis must take into consideration the right of states to seek to further 
other, and equally important, social goals, even at the expense of pure antitrust analysis.”), 
aff’d, 408 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2005). 
345 AMC Report, supra note 142, at 422–23. 
346 Id. at 423. 
347 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–92 (2007); 
Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572–73 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting 
that, “even if a negative effect on consumer welfare and competition can be shown to flow 
from a restriction of intrabrand competition, the court must still look to any possible pro-
competitive effects on the interbrand market stemming from the intrabrand restriction”). 
348 2006 Guidelines Commentary, supra note 246, at 51. 
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that yield dynamic efficiencies but also higher prices,349 (4) mergers 
that yield greater productive efficiencies but reduce product variety,350 
and (5) firms enabled to merge to attain productive efficiencies versus 
the political and social implications of increased concentration351 and 
the competitive distortions of firms too big and too integral to fail.352 
 Now suppose, in our example of the paper mill merger, that some 
of the efficiencies will be passed on to some consumers, while other 
consumers will pay higher prices. One drafter of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines commented that the antitrust agencies may conclude that 
“the predicted harm to relatively few customers is not substantial 
enough to warrant an enforcement action, especially if the merger is 
expected to generate cognizable efficiencies that will benefit a larger 
set of customers so customers overall are likely to benefit from the 
merger.”353 This assertion, like the other trade-offs, raises several issues. 
 First, should the antitrust agency determine whether some citizens 
should bear the brunt of a merger so that other citizens may benefit? 
Suppose that, immediately after the merger, prices will increase on the 
lower-end products, but that the merger may provide “positive non-
price effects (e.g., benefits from new or improved products) in the 
longer term.”354 This merger, as the OECD recognized, “puts investiga-
tors in the awkward position of needing to compare different concepts 
                                                                                                                      
Inextricably linked out-of-market efficiencies, however, can cause the Agen-
cies, in their discretion, not to challenge mergers that would be challenged 
absent the efficiencies. This circumstance may arise, for example, if a merger 
presents large procompetitive benefits in a large market and a small anticom-
petitive problem in another, smaller market. 
Id. 
349 Id. at 49 (“Efficiencies in the form of quality improvements also may be sufficient to 
offset anticompetitive price increases following a merger.”); OECD Policy Brief, supra note 
207, at 5 (stating that a “merger may cause prices to rise soon after consummation but it 
may also bring about dynamic efficiencies that have positive non-price effects such as ben-
efits from new or improved products in the longer term”). 
350 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 207, § 6.4 (contending that not all reductions 
in variety post-merger are anticompetitive as some “can lead to efficient consolidation of 
products when variety offers little in value to customers”). 
351 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 Anti-
trust L.J. 249, 258–59 (2001). 
352 Markham, supra note 37, at 270 (observing that, after antitrust officials permitted 
significant concentration in the banking industry, some banks became too integral and big 
to fail, leaving policymakers with choosing “which among competing failures to cure via 
bailout funding”). 
353 Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 Antitrust L.J. 49, 67 n.69 (2010). 
354 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 187, at 10. 
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from different time periods—and possibly from two or more different 
markets with different sets of consumers.”355 A merger may benefit 
some consumers, but harms others. It is just a question of which con-
sumers. Thus, whether the court or agency acts or refuses to act, in 
most situations it is promoting some set of values. 
 Second, it is questionable whether enforcers and generalist courts, 
consistent with the rule of law, can assess how “much quality enhance-
ment or how many new products are necessary for some customers to 
compensate for a given expected price increase affecting other cus-
tomers” in other markets.356 In assessing whether lower-income con-
sumers (with a higher marginal utility of money) should have to pay 
higher prices post-merger so that wealthier consumers receive better 
quality products, the agencies’ decision will likely implicate political, 
social, and moral values. 
 Third, even if the agencies could make this trade-off solely on eco-
nomic considerations, whether they should becomes both a political and 
social issue. Arguably, individuals (as a quality-of-life matter), rather 
than an antitrust agency, subject to the risk of regulatory capture, 
should determine whether the potential innovation is significant 
enough to warrant the higher price. But often consumers cannot make 
this decision independently. Mergers can harm consumers in one mar-
ket, while benefitting consumers in other markets. Thus, normative 
values come into play as to who should decide this trade-off: the legisla-
tive branch, the enforcement agency, or the court?357 
 One recent case illustrates antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs.358 
The State of California, under the antitrust laws, challenged a profit-
sharing agreement among several large southern California supermar-
ket chains during a labor strike.359 The major supermarkets advocated 
                                                                                                                      
 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). 
[V]alue choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial 
competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress 
when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve our tra-
ditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mer-
gers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that 
some price might have to be paid. 
Id. 
358 See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011). 
359 Id. at 1123 (recounting that grocers agreed that, in “a strike/lockout, any grocer 
that earned revenues above its historical share relative to the other chains during the strike 
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one trade-off: even if their temporary profit-sharing agreement re-
duced the supermarkets’ incentives to compete in the short term, it 
increased their chances of winning the labor dispute with their union-
ized employees.360 Thus, the court would trade-off any short-term re-
duction in competition in exchange for lowering retail prices to con-
sumers over the long term. In defeating the union, the supermarkets 
could lower their employee wages and their costs, and thereby lower 
the retail prices charged to consumers. Also, by pooling profits over the 
short-term to defeat the union, the supermarkets could better compete 
against other retailers over the long term. 
 Rather than evaluate the competitors’ profit-pooling agreement 
under the per se illegal or quick-look legal standards, the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately left the parties and the lower court to ramble through the 
wilds of economic theory. The Ninth Circuit required “fair considera-
tion of all factors relevant under the traditional rule of reason test, so as 
to determine if there are significant anticompetitive impacts and, if so, 
whether they outweigh any legitimate justifications.”361 Important here 
is that a decision will be made, and entering that decision will be social, 
political, and moral concerns. Thus, even under a pure economic ap-
proach, enforcers and courts will confront complex trade-offs, whereby 
one group will benefit, while another will be harmed. And the price is 
not always clear. Each group can value the benefits and costs of the 
trade-off differently, and some values are incommensurable (such as 
fairness and liberty considerations in permitting some consumers to be 
exploited so that others benefit). 
2. Importance of Morals and Fairness to Support a Market Economy 
 Individuals, as repeatedly shown in the empirical behavioral eco-
nomics literature, do not predictably behave as neoclassical economic 
theory posits.362 They do not delineate between economic and none-
conomic considerations when considering fairness.363 After years of 
socialization and the internalization of social, moral, ethical, and legal 
                                                                                                                      
period would pay 15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to 
restore their pre-strike shares”). 
360 Id. at 1160 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
361 Id. at 1139. Since California stipulated that it would not challenge the restraint un-
der the rule of reason, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was a victory for defendants. Id. at 1139 & 
n.18. 
362 See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 260, at 1528–30 (collecting several applications 
of behavioral economics). 
363 Kahneman et al., supra note 195, at 729. 
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norms, they do not enter the marketplace with a blank slate.364 Ulti-
mately economics is not a value-free science,365 inoculated from norma-
tive judgments. Thus, any competition policy, in a world with humans, 
transaction costs, coercion, and informational asymmetries is built on 
the normative judgments of legal and informal institutions.366 In turn, 
principles of ethics, morals, and fairness, rather than compromise, can 
strengthen a market economy.367 
3. Praising Antitrust’s Purity Is Praising Its Irrelevancy 
 Even if technocrats somehow could exclude social, moral, and po-
litical values from antitrust policy, they must still articulate how their 
work improves well-being. Antitrust monasteries are not feasible in de-
mocracies. Competition authorities seldom have unrestricted endow-
ments. Nor would many politicians leave money outside the antitrust 
monastery so as to not pollute the technocrats inside. Competition 
agencies compete with other agencies for funding. So, if antitrust policy 
is irrelevant to the pressing societal issues, then antitrust, relegated to a 
niche organization with little resources, is easier to marginalize. 
 Moreover, a plea for antitrust purity can divorce antitrust techno-
crats from public concerns. Some antitrust goals are important to the 
public and Congress but are dismissed by antitrust technocrats. Take, 
for example, the goal of protecting small competitors. In one recent 
survey, “About 8 in 10 (81%) [European Union] citizens agreed that 
small companies needed to be protected from large companies’ compe-
tition.”368 Indeed more citizens “totally agree[d]” with that than other 
                                                                                                                      
 
364 Hayek, supra note 63, at 125 (“The ultimate ends of the activities of reasonable be-
ings are never economic.”); Horton, supra note 62, at 475 (stating that “neoclassical econ-
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365 F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in How the 
Chicago School Overshot the Mark, supra note 86, at 30, 31 (noting how “economic 
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366 Coase, supra note 296, at 717 (recognizing that once “we move from a regime of ze-
ro transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs” the legal system’s fundamental 
importance quickly becomes apparent); Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through 
Time, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 359, 361 (1994) (characterizing economic markets as typically 
imperfect and beset by high transaction costs). 
367 See supra note 285. 
368 Eur. Comm’n, Flash EB Series No. 264—EU Citizens’ Perceptions About 
Competition Policy 7 (2009) [hereinafter EU Citizen Survey], available at http://ec. 
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statements considered antitrust gospel, such as that competition be-
tween companies allows for more choice369 and better prices370 for con-
sumers.371 This cannot be dismissed as European fancy. Protecting 
smaller competitors was one concern underlying the legislative amend-
ments to the Clayton Act, the primary antitrust statute involving merg-
ers.372 In addition, U.S. citizens who were surveyed had more confi-
dence in small businesses than big firms.373 
 But protecting small competitors, for some, is blasphemy.374 At 
times, it is.375 Conventional wisdom shows that the antitrust laws protect 
competition, not competitors.376 
 From the technocrats’ perspective, the citizens, even the highly 
educated,377 are ill-informed. From the citizens’ perspective, the tech-
nocrats must recognize that protecting small companies represents an 
important value to be independently protected; alternatively, the tech-
nocrats, with their focus on static price competition and productive ef-
ficiencies, cannot otherwise see, as can citizens working in the private 
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agree” and thirty percent “somewhat agree”). 
369 Id. (forty-nine percent totally agree). 
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372 See supra note 68. 
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aspx. 
374 AMC Report, supra note 142, at 34. 
375 Congress, for example, requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to create 
an identifiable office to provide small tobacco product manufacturers technical and other 
nonfinancial assistance in complying with the requirements of the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123 Stat. 1776, 1787 (2009) 
(to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a). It is unclear why Congress, on the one hand, makes 
numerous findings of the health risks and social costs of this addictive product while, on 
the other hand, requires taxpayers to subsidize smaller tobacco manufacturers’ compli-
ance costs. 
376 See AMC Report, supra note 142, at 34. 
377 EU Citizen Survey, supra note 368, at 15 (reporting that “[r]espondents with a 
higher level of education were also more likely to agree that mergers between large com-
panies might distort competition (75% vs. 61% of the least educated respondents)” but 
“were more likely to doubt whether small companies should be protected from large com-
panies’ competition,” and that 18% with a higher level of education disagreed with the 
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sector, the harms from concentrated economic power. Small start-ups, 
as one recent study found, drive dynamic competition.378 Start-ups that 
survive “have higher productivity levels and higher productivity gains 
than more mature establishments,” and help replace “lower productiv-
ity businesses with new, more productive ones, thereby increasing pro-
ductivity overall.”379 Start-ups create the bulk of private sector jobs in 
the United States.380 
 Consequently, antitrust officials who warn about social, moral, and 
political values polluting antitrust analysis are not arguing for sound 
competition analysis.381 They argue for an antitrust analysis divorced 
from reality, a world occupied by self-interested profit-maximizers, un-
concerned about fairness and trust, in markets without transaction 
costs and property rights. In short, they render antitrust irrelevant. The 
surveyed ICN members considered “that the most important obstacle 
to their advocacy work surges from the different objectives and opin-
ions held by other Governmental authorities.”382 Seeking to sequester 
competition goals from moral, social, and political values will not 
bridge this divide. 
IV. Accounting for Antitrust’s Multiple Objectives  
in the Legal Framework 
 As Part III discusses, any country’s competition law likely will en-
compass, but not necessarily rank, multiple economic, social, moral, 
and political goals. The issue is not whether competition policy should 
incorporate noneconomic values. Rather, as this Part discusses, the is-
sue is the degree of freedom that courts and enforcers should have in 
weighing multiple goals in their analysis.383 Section A proposes blend-
                                                                                                                      
378 Steven J. Davis et al., Kauffman Found. of Entrepreneurship, Turmoil and 
Growth: Young Businesses, Economic Churning, and Productivity Gains 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/TurmoilandGrowth060208.pdf. 
379 Id. 
380 John Haltiwanger et al., Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing: Jobs Created from 
Business Startups in the United States 1 (unpublished report) ( Jan. 1, 2009), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1352538 (comparing the fraction of employment accounted for by U.S. 
private-sector business startups with the average annual net employment growth of the 
U.S. private sector over the 1980–2005 period and inferring “that, excluding the jobs from 
new firms, the U.S. net employment growth rate is negative on average”). 
381 See Hayek, supra note 63, at 100 (noting that all collectivist systems feature the “de-
liberate organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal”). 
382 ICN Advocacy Report, supra note 104, at 72. 
383 See infra notes 386–450 and accompanying text. 
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ing antitrust goals and provides two illustrations.384 Section B raises the 
benefits and certain risks of a blended goal approach.385 
 One issue is how to weigh multiple objectives if, as Part II discusses, 
each objective has shortcomings. For example, promoting efficiency 
cannot be the primary goal, as all the antitrust scholars and policymak-
ers, taken together, still would not know how to maximize dynamic, al-
locative, and productive efficiencies in the long run.386 Of course, we 
cannot “pretend[] to know what in fact cannot be known.”387 Another 
issue is whether the goals are better achieved directly (like the goal of 
crossing the street) or obliquely.388 
 In reconsidering antitrust’s goals, policymakers should look at the 
business literature that, after the financial crisis, is arguing for a “more 
sophisticated form of capitalism, one imbued with a social purpose.”389 
In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and profitability 
generally were seen as conflicting.390 Shared value views these concepts 
as reinforcing. Shared value “involves creating economic value . . . for 
society by addressing its needs and challenges” and “enhanc[ing] the 
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the eco-
nomic and social conditions in the communities in which it oper-
ates.”391 Profits can be attained, not through exploitation (e.g., creating 
demand for harmful or useless products), but through collaboration 
and trust, and in better helping consumers solve their problems. Sus-
tainability, rather than a cost, represents an opportunity for companies 
to improve productivity and societal welfare.392 
 So too, important political, social, economic, and moral values can 
reinforce, rather than undermine, any concept of fair competition. 
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386 Christian Ewald, Competition and Innovation: Dangerous “Myopia” of Economists in Anti-
trust?, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2008, at 253, 261. 
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388 Kay, supra note 259, at 195 (arguing that direct goals are appropriate (1) “when the 
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389 See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capi-
talism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 
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390 Porter & Kramer, supra note 389, at 64. 
391 Id. at 64, 66. 
392 OECD, Roundtable on Pro-Active Policies for Green Growth and the Mar-
ket Economy—Note by the Delegation of the United States 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/1010greengrowth.pdf. 
2012] Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals 613 
Ideally the politically accountable legislature (but, given Congress’s ret-
icence, more likely the courts) would blend the multiple objectives into 
legal standards that comport with rule of law principles. 
A. Blending Antitrust’s Objectives 
 To illustrate how blending goals works, we can combine several 
popular competition goals, ensuring: (1) an effective, competitive pro-
cess by enhancing efficiency, while promoting economic freedom; (2) a 
level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises; and (3) fairness. 
In blending these goals, lawmakers can hope to expand the range of 
entrepreneurial opportunity seeking to satisfy any increasing consumer 
demand for choice. 
 As Part III discusses, the U.S. economy relies on new entrants for 
productivity gains and job creation. Promoting economic freedom and 
opportunity and ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized 
enterprises will likely promote, rather than undermine, dynamic effi-
ciency.393 In addition, promoting these blended goals can strengthen 
the network’s resilience.394 Ensuring a “multiplicity and diversity of in-
dependently innovating firms,” can (1) promote the “searching for new 
problem solutions and safeguarding the effectiveness of competition as 
a process of parallel experimentation and mutual learning,”395 and (2) 
provide a faster adaptation to exogenous shocks.396 
 The blended goal can also promote productive efficiencies. A low 
to moderately concentrated industry with diverse competitors can offer 
greater benefits to competitors than a highly concentrated industry. 
One empirical study found a positive correlation between industry va-
riety and performance.397 In considering why the entire industry bene-
fits when firms pursue a variety of competitive strategies, the study’s 
authors posit that, with less variety, there will be less opportunity for the 
firms to learn of the changing conditions and demands, and appropri-
ate responses thereto.398 Likewise, one scholar identified how competi-
                                                                                                                      
393 Fox, supra note 216, at 80. 
394 Sally J. Goerner et al., Quantifying Economic Sustainability: Implications for Free-Enterprise 
Theory, Policy and Practice, 69 Ecological Econ. 76, 77 (2009). 
395 Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity Through Competi-
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itations 173, 174 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011). 
396 See Horton, supra note 62, at 488, 491; Kerber, supra note 395, at 179. 
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tors mutually gain from localized competition, such as knowledge spill-
overs, improving the quality of their labor pool, and strengthening 
their network of suppliers.399 A diversity of local competitors can spur 
variety in products, as competitors strive to differentiate from their ri-
vals’ products, as well as in production techniques and strategies, which 
can lead to further innovation. 
1. A Blended Approach for Monopolist’s Exclusionary Behavior 
 One concern underlying economic freedom arises when monopo-
lists, through exclusionary behavior, seek to stifle the introduction of 
variation or otherwise impede the market’s feedback mechanism.400 
Entrenched firms jointly or unilaterally seek to limit the introduction of 
variation by entrants and consumers’ ability to experiment with new 
products or services.401 
 One recent example is Intel.402 The FTC alleged that the monopo-
list sought to block or slow the adoption of competitive products by, 
among other things, paying or otherwise inducing suppliers of com-
plementary software and hardware products to eliminate or limit their 
support of non-Intel microprocessors. Intel allegedly induced com-
puter manufacturers “to forgo advertising, to forgo branding, to forgo 
certain distribution channels, and/or to forgo promotion of computers 
containing non-Intel CPUs.”403 Suppose Intel could prove during the 
complaint period that microprocessor prices actually declined at an 
annual rate of forty-two percent (a price decrease greater than for any 
other high-technology product) and output of its x86 microprocessors 
                                                                                                                      
399 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 662–69 (1990); 
Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, in Unique Value: 
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402 Complaint ¶ 2, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf. 
403 Id. ¶ 52. 
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grew from 136.5 million to 324.7 million.404 If allocative and productive 
efficiency were the antitrust goals, the FTC would have a hard time 
showing that, absent Intel’s conduct, prices likely would have been low-
er and output greater. 
 But under a blended goal, the FTC could show how Intel’s con-
duct inhibited its competitors from effectively marketing their products 
to customers. In turn, it could show that this harmed choice (and com-
petition) at the downstream original equipment manufacturers 
(“OEM”) and consumer levels, and reduced the OEMs’ incentive and 
ability to innovate and differentiate their products in ways that would 
appeal to customers.405 A blended goal could promote rivalry and con-
sumer choice, which are “the essential conditions for guaranteeing 
competition and sustainable incentives for innovation.”406 
 This blended approach is not novel. For example, the European 
Commission infers anticompetitive effects when a monopolist “prevents 
its customers from testing the products of competitors or provides fi-
nancial incentives to its customers on condition that they do not test 
such products, or pays a distributor or a customer to delay the intro-
duction of a competitor’s product.”407 Furthermore, in curtailing the 
available antitrust defenses for a group boycott, the Supreme Court 
implicitly blended these goals.408 And as Hayek argued, it is “essential 
that entry into the different trades should be open to all on equal 
terms and that the law should not tolerate any attempts by individuals 
or groups to restrict this entry by open or concealed force.”409 
 A blended objective would promote economic opportunity with-
out unduly penalizing more efficient firms from competing. Economic 
freedom does not mean economic equality.410 One cannot assume that 
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all sellers have the same “best practices” and routines, or the same qual-
ity of goods and services. Under the blended approach, antitrust would 
not require a competitor to degrade the quality of its products or ser-
vices or otherwise punish firms that succeed because of their superior 
efficiency or product offerings. So a business that loses sales because of 
its inability to solve the consumers’ problems “is not the victim of eco-
nomic oppression, but of [its] own inefficient methods.”411 In deter-
mining whether the monopolist’s challenged conduct is exclusionary 
and unreasonably restrains other competitors’ economic freedom, the 
competition authority could consider whether the challenged conduct 
is capable of excluding an equally efficient competitor.412 
2. A Blended Approach for Media Industries 
 Media industries provide another example of the importance in 
blending economic and noneconomic goals. In some industries, with 
high, fixed costs and homogeneous products, consumers do not desire 
product variety. Consumers prefer mergers that enable firms to achieve 
economies of scale by rationalizing production lines. But for media in-
dustries, consumers may desire product variety from competing inde-
pendent news sources even at the cost of some efficiency. The product 
variety yields a desired outcome (vibrant marketplace of ideas) that, in 
turn, promotes the quality-of-life factors important for well-being.413 
 Under a blended goal, cost-savings efficiencies are relevant when 
they demonstrably yield greater output of better quality program-
ming.414 But, under a blended goal, antitrust policy will not focus en-
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tirely on short-term, productive efficiencies and competitive advertising 
rates. This was the DOJ’s mistake in the past antitrust policy cycle when 
reviewing radio mergers. Consumers suffered as a result. 
 In 1996, Congress and the Federal Communications Commission 
relaxed the media ownership rules.415 They did so under the banner of 
promoting competition and reducing regulation in order “to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunica-
tions consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new tele-
communications technologies.”416 Not surprisingly, immediately after 
the 1996 Telecom Act, there was, as one Clinton administration official 
remarked, an “explosion of radio mergers.”417 In analyzing radio merg-
ers, the DOJ considered their economic impact solely with respect to 
advertisers and the rates they paid.418 Even though other possible 
product markets existed, such as listenership and programming, the 
DOJ consent decrees never addressed the merger’s likely impact on 
programming quality, listener choice, or on the marketplace of 
ideas.419 Despite the rising industry concentration, the DOJ challenged 
few radio mergers.420 It required firms to divest radio stations in only 
those highly concentrated markets where it predicted advertisers would 
likely pay higher rates.421 
                                                                                                                     
 Although Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1950 to arrest 
“concentration in the American economy, whatever its cause, in its in-
cipiency,”422 the DOJ called the concentration in the radio industry 
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“healthy” given the potential for efficiencies.423 The ensuing consolida-
tion adversely impacted non-price competition, such as programming 
quality and programming choices for listeners.424 Moreover, the indus-
try consolidation adversely affected advertising rates, which, ironically, 
was the DOJ’s sole focus.425 The former head of commercial radio for 
Infinity Broadcasting and CBS and the current CEO of Sirius XM rec-
ognized that commercial radio after the 1996 Act became “totally ho-
mogenized,”426 and advocated for radio consolidation “[s]trictly for 
business reasons. No one asked . . . if it was good for consumers.”427 
 By blending goals, lawmakers can enable smaller media firms to 
grow through mergers. But rather than embrace concentration as 
“healthy” and consider the mergers’ effect only on advertising rates, 
antitrust officials should be skeptical about monopolies or mergers in 
already concentrated industries that are said to be likely to yield addi-
tional productive efficiencies. 
B. Risks and Benefits of a Blended Approach 
 As one scholar observed, “The difficult question is not whether 
noneconomic considerations are a proper, indeed conventional, com-
ponent of the antitrust calculus, but how to take them into account.”428 
A trade-off exists between antitrust goals and legal standards. With a 
narrowly defined antitrust objective, one can use an open-ended, fact-
specific weighing standard, such as the rule of reason. The specific goal 
limits the enforcers’ and courts’ discretion when weighing the facts, as 
the goal permits only one outcome. Alternatively, one can have multi-
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ple (and conflicting) policy objectives, if they are synthesized into clear 
rules that market participants can internalize and follow. 
 This trade-off is seen in past antitrust cycles. Up until the late 
1970s, the Supreme Court recognized antitrust’s multiple economic 
and noneconomic goals. Accordingly, the Court generally (but not al-
ways) sought four things. First, it sought a legal standard that was ad-
ministrable for generalist judges.429 With some exceptions, the Court 
turned to the legislative history or common law precedent as a basis for 
its standards.430 Second, the Court sought legal standards to enhance 
predictability.431 For example, in devising the thirty percent market 
share presumption for mergers, the Court sought to foster business au-
tonomy: unless business executives “can assess the legal consequences 
of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is re-
tarded.”432 The Court’s role was to provide clearer guidance on what 
was civilly (and criminally) illegal under the Sherman Act. Third, the 
Court sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged down in 
difficult economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and in-
tra-brand competition.433 Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its 
institutional competence, the Court recognized that the legislature, 
although subject to rent-seeking, was more politically accountable than 
the judiciary; so Congress must make these normative trade-offs.434 
 In the past policy cycle, the Court went the opposite direction. It 
increasingly emphasized one type of competition (static price competi-
tion) and one antitrust goal (consumer welfare), and deemphasized 
antitrust’s political, moral, and social objectives.435 The Court increas-
ingly narrowed the applicability of its per se illegal standard and broad-
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ened the applicability of its more fact-intensive, case-specific rule-of-
reason inquiry.436 
 One risk of the blended goal approach, therefore, is incorporating 
multiple goals into the Court’s prevailing legal standard, the rule of 
reason. One cannot have, consistent with the rule of law, a fact-specific 
weighing standard and multiple policy objectives. Having the agencies 
and courts blend goals in every antitrust case is a recipe for disaster.437 
It is questionable whether antitrust enforcers and courts can opera-
tionalize multiple goals in a systematic fashion.438 Moreover, allowing 
them to blend goals provides greater freedom to make errors and be 
politically captured. 
 Accordingly, if courts and antitrust enforcers acknowledge anti-
trust’s traditional political, social, and moral goals, then the rule of rea-
son cannot be antitrust’s prevailing legal standard. Instead, they must 
blend such goals into clearer rules and legal presumptions. 
 Ultimately, the debate is which is the better trade-off: a single well-
defined goal/rule-of-reason standard or multiple goals/clearer rules. 
As this Article discusses, the quest for a single well-defined goal has 
failed.439 Thus, antitrust is adrift under the rule of reason. On the other 
hand, one drafter of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, in praising the 
Guidelines’ flexibility, doubted the business community’s desire to re-
turn to the 1960s antitrust policies: “Accounting for the real-world 
business conditions in which a merger takes place is worthwhile, even if 
doing so means that some simplicity must be sacrificed to achieve 
greater accuracy in merger enforcement.”440 
 On one level, the drafter is correct. Companies seeking to merge 
in highly concentrated industries prefer a fact-intensive weighing stan-
dard to a presumption of illegality. At times, a competitively neutral or 
beneficial merger violates the simpler standard. Moreover, the rule of 
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reason enables the agencies and courts to respond flexibly to resolve 
novel problems that continually emerge over time. 
 But this thinking, common in the past antitrust cycle, rests on two 
assumptions. First, for most mergers and restraints, a fact-intensive rule-
of-reason analysis yields greater accuracy. Second, the business com-
munity prefers the rule-of-reason analysis. These assumptions, as I ex-
plore elsewhere,441 are empirically suspect. No one knows whether the 
1992 or 2010 Merger Guidelines increased accuracy, as no one systemi-
cally evaluated post-merger whether the agency accurately predicted 
the merger’s competitive effects. Indeed, by weighing some factors 
(claimed efficiencies) and not others (editorial competition), as re-
flected in the DOJ’s review of radio mergers, the fact-intensive inquiry 
can lead to a worse outcome—higher ad rates, poorer quality, and a less 
robust marketplace of ideas. 
 There is no empirical evidence that courts and antitrust enforcers 
systematically optimize efficiency across industries through the vague 
rule-of-reason standard. Nor is there any evidence that firms prefer the 
costly, time-intensive, rule-of-reason analysis to clearer rules. Several 
factors suggest that clearer, simpler rules may be more advantageous. 
First, simpler rules that emphasize a limited number of structural fac-
tors can facilitate “both enforcement decision-making and business 
planning which involves anticipation of the Department’s enforcement 
intent.”442 If courts, with the assistance of antitrust lawyers, have diffi-
culties applying the rule of reason, corporate counsel will also have a 
hard time advising their clients on the conduct’s legality, and it will be 
hard for employees to internalize norms of what is reasonable and un-
reasonable behavior. 
 Second, as private and public antitrust enforcement increases 
globally, the costs from uncertain and inconsistent legal outcomes will 
likely increase. Thus, the demand for convergence increases. Conver-
gence can occur on two levels: goals and/or legal standards. As the ICN 
surveys show, competition authorities have not converged, nor will they 
likely converge, on a single well-defined antitrust goal. The newer anti-
trust regimes are unlikely, especially after the financial crisis, to regress 
to a simplistic conception of competition and quest for a single eco-
nomic goal. Countries that are adopting or revising their competition 
laws are not condemned to repeat the failures of U.S. antitrust policy, 
                                                                                                                      
441 See Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1421–73 (discussing how antitrust in the 
past cycle, under the Court’s rule-of-reason legal standard, deteriorated in terms of accu-
racy, transparency, objectivity, administrability, and consistency). 
442 DOJ, 1968 Merger Guidelines 2 (1968), www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. 
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as some Chicago and post-Chicago school adherents did in debating 
over a single economic goal. 
 Consequently, any global convergence will be on the legal stan-
dards. With different antitrust objectives, however, one cannot expect 
the same legal standards globally. So the convergence will not be over 
the substance of the standard, but the extent to which the legal stan-
dard conforms to rule of law principles. Multi-national companies likely 
will demand convergence on legal standards that provide greater 
transparency, objectivity, accuracy, and predictability. They increasingly 
will demand clearer rules that their employees can easily internalize 
(and reduce compliance costs), that will bind them and their competi-
tors, and that will enable them reasonably to anticipate what actions 
would be prosecuted so that they can channel their behavior in welfare-
enhancing directions.443 As the recent ICN survey observed, “A clearly 
set and uniformly enforced standard is, therefore, of utmost relevance for 
enforcement agencies, the business community and final consum-
ers.”444 Accordingly, any future convergence will not be over antitrust’s 
goals (that effort proved unsuccessful in the past policy cycle) or par-
ticular legal standards. Instead, any convergence will come initially 
from increasing the transparency of antitrust’s legal standards (and 
bringing them closer to the rule of law ideals). 
 This makes the Supreme Court’s rule-of-reason standard an unat-
tractive export, especially to countries with less developed judiciaries 
and multiple antitrust goals. Firms will prefer to avoid the extraordi-
nary time and expense of a rule-of-reason analysis in China, Russia, the 
United States, or the European Union. This does not mean a return to 
per se illegal standards or the death of the rule of reason, which courts 
and agencies could continue to employ in novel cases. Instead for most 
run-of-the-mill restraints (such as resale price maintenance, or “RPM”), 
the demand for, and supply of, more administrable standards, such as 
presumptions of illegality, with well-defined exceptions or defenses, will 
increase. The challenge will be “how to strike a balance between the 
gains of a more effects-based approach and a higher degree of tailor-
made decisions on the one hand, and the extra resources that are 
needed to achieve this and less legal certainty on the other hand.”445 
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 “Legal requirements are prescribed by legislatures and courts, not 
by economic science.”446 The Supreme Court neglected this in the past 
antitrust cycle. The trend in economics is towards more complex, yet 
realistic, conceptions of competition and market participants. Accord-
ingly, to the extent that courts allow themselves to be led by economic 
theories, businesses and the antitrust bar will be more skeptical about 
enforcers’ and courts’ abilities to predict competitive outcomes or max-
imize efficiency in those markets through the rule of reason. They will 
increasingly demand simpler standards, more in accord with the rule of 
law, that incorporate antitrust’s blended goals. 
 Thus, in the next policy cycle, antitrust’s legal standards can shift 
in two ways. First, as recently signaled in 2009 by the Supreme Court in 
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc., the Court can 
shift from a “case-by-case” rule-of-reason analysis, which focuses on the 
“particular facts disclosed by the record”447 to simpler antitrust stan-
dards and rules “clear enough for lawyers to explain them to clients.”448 
Second, the standards may shift, whenever feasible, from directly regu-
lating market participants’ behavior to a blended goal of maintaining a 
competitive structure and preserving freedom therein. 
 Besides increasing demand for better legal standards, a blended 
goal approach increases antitrust’s salience. Currently, to achieve con-
sensus, antitrust relies on ill-defined goals, like promoting consumer 
welfare. The current debate over a total versus consumer surplus stan-
dard may interest antitrust technocrats, but few others. Moreover, the 
debate over antitrust goals is no longer a domestic affair. 
 One question is: why should countries adopt antitrust laws? With 
the realignment of global economic power, the future debate over the 
purpose of antitrust law will likely be between a “Democracy Consen-
sus” and “Authoritarian Consensus.” To the extent that the Beijing 
Consensus continues in its present form (a far from certain conclu-
sion)449, and to the extent that maximizing productive and allocative 
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ing Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925)). 
448 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 453 (2009) (quoting 
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Thomas A. Lambert, 
The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 871, 878, 899 (2011) (character-
izing the LinkLine holding as “a product of decision theory” or a theory of antitrust which 
seeks to “minimize the sum of decision and error costs”). 
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efficiency is antitrust’s goal, then China can claim the advantage. The 
authoritarian government can claim that the rule of law, democracy, 
and individual freedoms are unnecessary to secure this economic goal. 
Indeed antitrust is one of several industrial policies to promote effi-
ciency. 
 The Democracy Consensus, however, can reply by arguing that an-
titrust’s primary aim is not simply to lower price, but to prevent the 
formation of powerful firms and state-controlled enterprises that 
threaten a dynamic economy and democracy. The “competitive system 
is the only system designed to minimize by decentralization the power 
exercised by man over man.”450 The Democracy Consensus, consistent 
with this broader concept of competition, can emphasize the impor-
tance of economic, personal, and political freedoms for their own sake, 
as well as to promote dynamic efficiencies and well-being. Accordingly, 
antitrust’s salience increases. 
Conclusion 
 Other than for idealists, competition policy in any democracy with 
reasonable pluralism cannot be reduced to a single, well-defined goal. 
Any antitrust policy, which seeks to promote well-being, must balance 
multiple political, social, moral, and economic objectives. 
 The quest in the United States for a single economic goal was a 
failure. No consensus was ever reached on a specific, well-defined goal. 
The quest did not significantly improve antitrust analysis or align it 
closer to rule of law principles. Antitrust’s current objectives of promot-
ing consumer welfare and efficiency are poorly defined. Its prevailing 
rule-of-reason legal standard fares poorly under rule of law principles. 
The quest distanced antitrust from important policy issues (such as sys-
temic risk) and rendered antitrust less relevant. 
 Consequently, now is the time to reconsider antitrust’s political, 
social, and moral concerns. In reconsidering the goals of competition 
as a means to secure political, economic, and individual freedoms, anti-
trust can be more responsive to citizens’ concerns about promoting 
well-being. With a blended goal approach incorporated in better legal 
standards, antitrust, in the next policy cycle, will be harder to marginal-
ize. 
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Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Antitrust Cases Filed in U.S. Dis-
trict Courts (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t5412010.csv. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2001–2010, DOJ, http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
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